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Jesuit Educational Quarterly

UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE AND CAMPUS CONSENSUS

**LAY WITNESS:
THE QUALIFICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY IMPACT**

**A STANDARDIZED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM FOR
JESUIT HIGH SCHOOLS**

ENROLLMENT STATISTICS

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JESUIT EDUCATIONAL QUARTERLY

University Governance and Campus Consensus

PATRICK H. RATTERMAN, S.J.

Introduction

President Ray L. Haffner of Brown University has facetiously remarked that, "The only thing that holds a university together is a heating plant." At times in recent years it must have seemed on many campuses as though the heating plant was not functioning as well as might reasonably have been expected.

I have a suspicion, however, that it is most unfair to fault campus heating plants for the many disruptions that have occurred at so many of our nation's universities and colleges. I strongly suspect that another, far less tangible and seldom discussed factor is really a great deal more to blame. I shall propose that a *breakdown in campus consensus* is more frequently the problem when disruption threatens the accustomed peace and serenity, or perhaps apathy, of American campuses. In other words, when a campus shows weaknesses—or unexpected strengths—as it is rocked by the revolutionary pressures of the larger society. I strongly suspect that basically what is being challenged is the campus consensus and that quite probably the campus consensus is undergoing a serious re-thinking, re-evaluation, and adjustment. If my suspicions have any validity at all I am quite prepared to defend the thesis that campus consensus is just about the most interesting and important thing that can be discussed in relation to any particular university or college.

I am led to propose my thesis because of John Courtney Murray's conclusions concerning the importance of public consensus to our civil society. "The consensus is come to by the people; they become a people; by coming to it!"¹ Consensus is the basic means, Father Murray continues, by which a people attains its identity and selfness. If men become a people, attaining a self-recognition and public identity through public consensus, perhaps another form of consensus—and in this case we shall call it "campus consensus"—plays a determining role in the process by which a group of scholars becomes a university with its own unique self-ness and identity. Such shall be my line of reasoning in the present consideration.

PART I. BERLE-MURRAY ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC CONSENSUS

A. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. on Public Consensus

Murray's study of public consensus in civil society begins with a review of an analysis of the same matter proposed by Adolf A. Berle, Jr.² Berle is an economist who views the American economy primarily in terms of power. However, his reasonings with regard to our American economy carry him over into the realm of political philosophy when he asks himself: What ultimately controls the tremendous power generated by our American economy? What limitations does this economy recognize? By what means do operations within the American economy achieve a legitimacy? Who passes final judgment on the use and abuse of economic power in our American Society, and how?

In answering the questions he raises, Berle makes some interesting and insightful observations with respect to public consensus which are not only important to Murray's consideration but which will prove invaluable to the concept of campus consensus. Let me cite six such observations.

First, Berle holds that the ultimate factor which limits the use of economic power in the United States or in any free society, is public consensus. Public consensus "has set up, and more or less continuously develops, criteria by which the actions and results of economic power, and the men who possess it, are currently judged."³ According to Berle, therefore, judgments regarding the use or abuse of economic power in the United States are made according to a public consensus which already exists among the American people prior to any particular judgments being made.

Second, rejecting the two extremes, that public consensus is either a form of public opinion⁴ or a type of *innate* public wisdom ("spontaneous fact in the minds of many individuals"), Berle contends that the basic process by which public consensus is achieved involves human understanding and intellectual reasoning.

"[The public consensus] is the product of a body of thought and experience, sufficiently expressed in one form or another so that its principles are familiar to and have become accepted by those members of the community interested in the relevant field. . . . It is therefore essentially a body of doctrine which has attained wide, if not general, acceptance."⁵

Third, the supreme function of the public consensus in the United States is to provide criteria according to which the democratic character of the economy is maintained.

"This is the supreme function of the consensus—to determine the nature of the economy, to specify its style, and thus to insure that the style of economy accords with the whole larger style of life that the American people has adopted as its own—the 'democratic style' that identifies the American people as a people and characterizes its action."⁶

Fourth, Berle is careful to point out that the public consensus of a people is distinct from the law or government of that people. Far from being identified with law and government the public consensus has a capacity to criticize the law and government, and from time to time it must demand changes in existing law and government. Perhaps it can also be speculated that the consensus which expresses the spirit of a people must at times protect that people from the letter of its own law.

Fifth, Berle makes a historical observation which is of tremendous importance to our purposes because it demonstrates that public consensus exists on two levels. Berle asks how in feudal times, was the public consensus formed by which the economic power was regulated. He then explains that in the feudal system the economic power of the "Lords Temporal"

"was held to a degree of order (when it was) by the counter-vailing power . . . of [the Lords Spiritual] the priests, the scholars, and divines comprehended within the body of the then universal Catholic Church. When the system worked well, the spiritual order erected generally accepted standards or criteria of judgment. It also determined, somewhat crudely but sufficiently, whether the holder of temporal power had measured up to these standards."⁸

The identity of the "Lords Spiritual" in feudal times is interesting but tangential to our consideration. What is essential is to note that even in feudal times the public consensus necessarily involved two distinct levels. On the first or higher level certain "standards or criteria of judgment" were developed and enunciated by the "Lords Spiritual." On a second or lower level, only those standards and criteria of the "Lords Spiritual" which attained "wide, if not general, acceptance" among the people became a part of the pub-

lic consensus. The consensus necessarily existed on this second level, in the minds of the people. The content of the consensus was proposed earlier by an elite, in feudal times by the "Lords Spiritual."⁹

Sixth, in Berle's analysis the public consensus "is not static. It is in a constant state of gradual development."¹⁰ The consensus is subject to continual examination, criticism, and evolution. Therefore, while the public consensus may be dependent upon basic, immutable principles, it does not itself consist exclusively of such principles. It has an evolving, dynamic character as a result of its constant re-examination and adaptation. The public consensus must continually be reaffirmed or changed. It is in view of this need for continual reaffirmation or change of the public consensus, Berle points out, that a democratic society must protect freedom of thought, speech, and criticism, and encourage study, learning, and speculation.

B. John Courtney Murray on Public Consensus

It is not the purpose of this paper to provide a complete analysis of either Berle's or Murray's thought on public consensus. The only purpose we have in discussing either of their ideas on this subject is to discern how much, or how little, of their thought can be applied to a concept of campus consensus. On this basis the selection of material particularly from Murray's detailed and extremely learned discussion of public consensus will necessarily be quite limited. I shall group the material which is being excerpted from Murray under six headings: 1) What it (the public consensus) *is not*; 2) Barbarism; 3) Two levels of development; 4) What it *is*; 5) How it is determined; and 6) Attending consideration.

1) What it is not

Murray, like Berle, is so concerned with the variant popular uses of the term consensus that he takes great pains to re-establish the word itself to its traditional meaning. Murray explains why he is unwilling to relinquish the word.

"It is an apt word. It is also the historical word, whose use goes back to the origins of the Western constitutional tradition. From the Roman jurists, through St. Augustine, it passed into the Western political vocabulary. If it has now become colored by misleading connotations, it deserves to be redeemed into right usage."¹¹

Murray, like Berle, emphasizes the fact that consensus, in the "technical constitutional sense that the word bears within the Western tradition," is not to be confused with majority opinion, "certainly not in its origin."

"I would maintain . . . that the public consensus of the West, and of the United States as an historical participant in the Western style of civilization, would remain the public consensus, even if it were held, as perhaps it is held, only by a minority within the West. The validity of the consensus is radically independent of its possible status as either majority or minority opinion."¹²

A number of other meanings which Murray denies to public consensus are cited here because of their frequent use in the academic context. Consensus is not an equivalent of "public policies" which Murray defines as "standards furnished by the [consensus] according to which judgment is passed on the means that a nation adopts to achieve its purpose."¹³ The public policies of a people must certainly be in accord with their consensus. However, the policies of a people or of its government are not to be identified with their consensus.

Murray explicitly and by name repudiates the behaviorist, Marxist, and Cartesian concepts of consensus.

"The consensus is not a structure of secondary rationalization erected on psychological data (as the behaviorists would have it) or on economic data (as the Marxists would have it). It is not the residual minimum left after rigid application of the Cartesian axiom, "*de omnibus dubitandum*." It is not simply a set of working hypotheses whose value is pragmatic."¹⁴

On the basis of Murray's stated opinions there is no question but that he would deny that public consensus can be identified with the "participatory democracy" which radical left student groups are currently advocating. Murray would say rather that consensus provides the basis upon which a participatory democracy might form its judgments and make its decisions. Participatory democracy cannot serve as a substitute for consensus or long endure without it. Neither would consensus, in Murray's view, qualify as a form of public situation ethics. Murray's thinking on public consensus appears to avoid two extremes. On the one hand he does not regard the content of the consensus as so fundamental and

basic to rational intelligence that it constitutes a body of knowledge which is immediately apparent and unchangeable. Quite the contrary, he allows that public consensus can be quite wrong at times and, therefore, considerably in need of updating and adaptation. On the other hand, however, neither does Murray regard consensus as so everyday an affair that it is readily changed to meet current exigencies. In Murray's view public consensus is too radiated in both human nature and the public mind to allow for temporary, situational adjustments.

According to Murray, therefore, public consensus is definitely *not* to be identified with public opinion or public policy; it is *not* a body of secondary rationalizations erected on psychological or economic data; it is *not* a residual minimum that cannot be doubted. The term cannot be used as an equivalent to participatory democracy or an exercise in public situational ethics. These particular denials have been singled out in the text because of their possible relevance to our later consideration of campus consensus.

2) *Barbarism*

In Murray's view public consensus goes to the very guts of an understanding of civilization itself since it is through consensus that men overcome barbarism, achieve civility, and become "a people." Ultimately, except through public consensus men are unable significantly to realize either their humanity or, what Murray calls, their "sacredness."

Murray views the world as ever poised in a tenuous balance between civility and barbarism.

"It is the Christian theological intuition, confirmed by all of historical experience, that man lives both his personal and his social life always more or less close to the brink of barbarism, threatened not only by the disintegration of physical illness and by the disorganizations of mental imbalance, but also by the decadence of moral corruption and the political chaos of formlessness or the moral chaos of tyranny."¹⁵

Confronting the civilized man, therefore, Murray sees the barbarian whose perennial work is

"to undermine rational standards of judgment, to corrupt the inherited intuitive wisdom by which the people have always lived, and to do this not by spreading new beliefs but by creating a climate of doubt and bewilderment in which clar-

ity about the larger aims of life is dimmed and the self confidence of the people is destroyed, so that finally what you have is the impotent nihilism of 'the generation of the third eye,' now presently appearing on university campuses."¹⁶

Today's barbarian, Murray goes on to explain, perhaps wearing "a Brooks Brothers suit and carrying a ball point pen with which to write out his advertising copy,"

"is a man who makes open and explicit rejection of the traditional role of reason and logic in human affairs. He is the man who reduces all spiritual and moral questions to the test of practical results or to an analysis of language or to decision in terms of individual subjective feeling."¹⁷

As Murray explains, the barbarian

"a child of the wilderness, may lurk beneath an academic gown, untutored in the high tradition of civility, [one] who goes busily and happily about his work, a domesticated and law-abiding man, engaged in the construction of a philosophy to put an end to all philosophy, and thus to put an end to the possibility of a vital consensus and to civility itself."¹⁸

It is essential to the purpose of our discussion to note that Murray does not equate dissent with barbarism. Quite the contrary, he regards dissent as essential to both the emergence and development of consensus in a democratic society. Dissent "affirms the consensus," he maintains, provided it is rational and civil.

"[The vitality of the consensus] depends on a constant scrutiny of political experience, and this experience widens with the developing—or possibly the decaying—life of man in society. . . . The consensus needs to be constantly argued. If the public argument dies from disinterest, or subsides into the angry mutterings of polemic, or rises to the shrillness of hysteria, or trails off into positivistic triviality, or gets lost in a morals of semantics, you may be sure that the barbarian is at the gates of the city."¹⁹

One further point should be made with respect to Murray's concept of barbarism. Opposed to barbarism Murray would place man's "sacredness." since man's "sacredness" can only be realized among men who are civilized, Murray discusses "the sacredness of man" (*res sacra homo*) in connection with public consensus.²⁰ The

term "sacredness," as Murray uses it, does not connote exclusively a transcendental relationship with God. Its emphasis might lie more in what we would refer to today as "the dignity of man." Whatever the precise meaning and connotations, man cannot begin to realize his "sacredness" or dignity except in a society which is truly civilized. Man's most radical self-ness is at stake therefore, when mankind strives for, or fails to achieve, public consensus.

3) *Two levels of development*

Before attempting to determine the nature of public consensus or even to define the term, it is quite important to our ultimate purpose—to attempt to formulate a theory of campus consensus—that we study the elements which Murray insists are the presuppositions of all rational consensus. Without apology²¹ Murray explains consensus in terms of natural law applying to the consideration the method of Thomas Aquinas and the scholastic philosophers.

"My proposition is that only the theory of natural law is able to give an account of the public moral experience that is the public consensus. The [American] consensus itself is simply the tradition of reason as emergent in developing form in the special circumstances of American political-economic life."²²

Although the matter will be overly familiar with most readers, let me review very briefly what Murray describes as the four areas of moral consciousness. The judgments which comprise the public consensus are of the fourth area. Murray begins with a consideration of what he terms "the ethical *a priori*."

"Intelligence can grasp the ethical *a priori*, the first principle of the moral consciousness, which does not originate by argument, but which dawns, as it were, as reason itself emerges from the darkness of infant animalism. Human reason that is conscious of itself is also conscious of the primary truths both of the intellectual and of the moral consciousness that what is true cannot at the same time and under the same respect be false, and that what is good is to be done and what is evil avoided. This latter truth is what I call the ethical *a priori*."²³

The ethical *a priori* is based on three "presuppositions"—which Murray later explains are not really presuppositions "since they are susceptible of verification."²⁴ First, man by nature is intelligent and

as a result of his being intelligent has a natural inclination to act according to reason. Second, reality is intelligible. And third, reality, as grasped by intelligence, imposes on the will the obligation that it be obeyed in its demands for action or abstention. This ethical *a priori* constitutes for Murray the first of the four areas of moral consciousness which are involved in public consensus. Murray goes on to describe the second and third areas of moral consciousness.

“Second, after some elementary experience of the basic situation of human life, and upon some simple reflection of the meaning of the terms, intelligence can grasp the meaning of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in these [basic] situations and therefore know what is to be done or avoided in them.”²⁵

In explaining the second area of moral consciousness Murray cites the example of a child coming to realize, “intrinsically and antecedent to any human prohibition,” that to respect his parents is good while to show them disrespect would be wrong.

“Third, as the experience of reality unfolds in the unfolding of the various relationships and situations that are the reality of human life, intelligence, with the aid of simple reasoning, can know, and know to be obligatory, a set of natural-law principles that are derivative.”²⁸

Murray explains that the third area of moral consciousness would be that encompassed in general by the Ten Commandments.

Each of the steps outlined above introduces man to a new area of moral intelligence or moral consciousness. Since man has a natural inclination to act reasonably, it is reasonably to be expected that all normal men will take these first three steps and achieve both the second and third areas of moral consciousness. Of utmost importance to our consideration is Murray’s analysis of the *fourth* area of moral consciousness since it is in this area that the moral judgments are made which ultimately comprise the public consensus.

“There is a fourth area of achievement open to the moral reason of man. It concerns particular principles which represent the requirements of rational human nature in more complex human relationships and amid the institutional developments that accompany the progress of civilization. This area

is reserved for those whom St. Thomas calls "the wise" (*sapientes*). The reason for the reservation is clear. The further the human mind advances toward apprehending the particulars of morals, the greater is the part that knowledge, must play. To grasp the bearing of fundamental moral truth on particular human relations and on concrete social institutions requires a prior understanding of these relations and these institutions. They are in the case, the 'reality' in whose dense depths the demands of reason must be discerned, and then stated as dictates to be obeyed. Little reflection or experience is needed to know the principle of justice, '*Suum Cuique*' ('to each what is his'). But an extensive scientific analysis of the functioning of economic cooperation is needed to know what a just settlement of a wage-dispute might be."

"The elaboration of these particular and detailed—or, in traditional language, 'remote'—principles of natural law falls therefore to the wise. One might even better say, in George Washington's famous phrase, 'the wise and honest.' Not only knowledgeability but rectitude of judgment is required. . . . And in the growing complexity of the full human reality which is the characteristic of advanced civilization, these wise men have come to depend more and more on other scientific disciplines for aid in that analysis of reality which is the condition of all moral judgment."²⁷

Only through diligent study, therefore, can a *small group of men*, the "Lords Spiritual" of Berle's analysis, hope to form the moral judgments in the fourth area of moral consciousness because the problems in this area involve the more complex human relationships and institutional developments that accompany the progress of civilization. Ordinary men cannot be expected to have such detailed knowledge or to be capable of such complex judgments.

And yet, ordinary men must somehow be involved in judgments of the fourth area of moral reason if some of the judgments made in this area are to be incorporated into the *public* consensus. Murray explains, therefore, that those judgments of "the wise" which are widely and generally accepted by the people—that these particular judgments by this means become a part of the public consensus of that people. Public consensus is formed, therefore, when certain precepts are widely accepted and adopted by the people, these

precepts having been developed and enunciated by "the wise." As with Berle, therefore, Murray proposes that the public consensus involves two distinct levels of development.

4) *What it is*

Having noted in Murray's consideration: first, what the public consensus is not; second, his concept of barbarism; and third, his analysis of the fourth area of moral consciousness—we are finally in a position to attempt a definition of public consensus and to form some judgments with respect to its nature. Murray quotes with approval the following observations of Berle which initiate a descriptive consideration of public consensus. "There exists a set of ideas widely held by the community . . . that certain uses of [economic] power are 'wrong,' that is, contrary to the established interest and value system of the community." These "ideas" and "value judgments," Berle holds, are so firmly established, widely accepted, and deeply held in the political community that "public opinion can energize political action when needed to prevent [economic] power from violating these values." It is Berle's position, one in which Murray readily accedes, that these "ideas" and "value judgements" constitute the public consensus. The consensus is made up, therefore, of "principles," "tenets," "rules," "standards," and "criteria of judgment" which can be applied to individual cases or situations.²⁸

It is especially important to note that the public consensus, as viewed by both Berle and Murray, consists *primarily of a set of judgments which are reached by human reason.*

"The truths [of the public consensus] are the product of reason reflecting on human experience. They are not simply a codification or registration of experience, which carries the mind of man above the level of experience. Hence the affirmation of these truths pretends to and possesses a certain universal validity. Not only do *we* hold these truths; they are human truths of a sort that man as such is bound to hold."²⁹

The consensus, therefore, according to Berle and Murray, is a product of reason. It consists of the reflections of honest and wise men on the human experience of mankind. These reflections merit acceptance by the people precisely because they are *intelligible* and *reasonable*. The public consensus gets its strength and vitality from the fact that it is made up of truths which "man as such is

bound to hold." Murray refers to the public consensus as "a moral experience which is public."²⁹ Interchangeably with public consensus he uses the term "public philosophy."³⁰

It is most important to note that while Murray considers the public consensus to be made up of "human truths of a sort that man as such is bound to hold," he most definitely does not consider the public consensus to be made up of *a priori*, irreversible judgments which are developed in the second and third areas of moral reason or moral consciousness. According to Murray it is only on the fourth level of human moral consciousness that man achieves the ideas, principles, tenets, criteria of judgment, or whatever else might constitute the content of the public consensus. This is far removed from the first level (the ethical *a priori*) where the intelligibility of reality is immediately apparent to the human intellect "as it emerges from the darkness of infant animalism." Nor is this the second or third level where simple truths are immediately apparent to the newly awakened human intellect or reached later through *simple* reasonings. On Murray's fourth level of moral conscience, where the public consensus actually exists, the material of the considerations can be extremely complex and specialized. In this area the judgments of even "the wise" are at times wisely proposed only as hypotheses. There can be no guarantee, therefore, that the judgments of "the wise" on this fourth level of moral reason, even though they are widely and generally accepted by the people, provide for the consensus a body of truths which are absolutely irreversible.³¹

Murray describes the public consensus, therefore, as a body of "principles and rules [which] are *remote* principles of the natural law."³² He further assures his readers that the truth of these "remote" principles and rules is "by no means self evident."³³ Therefore, the consensus necessarily has "a growing end" which is open not just to reaffirmation through clarification but to addition and change.

"[The public consensus] is never finished, complete and perfect, beyond need or possibility of further development. What we call the West is an historical concept, or better, an historical process. It is therefore an open-ended action. There is always the possibility and need of progress in the consensus that sustains its life, as there is likewise the possibility and the danger of decadence. . . . One must expect therefore that the public consensus in terms of which the

free society defines its identity, will not be a static quantity. It must obey one or the other of the alternative laws of history, which are growth or decline, fuller integrity or disintegration.”³⁴

Murray explains that the natural “openness” of the political consensus provides an inbuilt “dynamism” which follows as a consequence of its sharing the dynamic character of the natural law itself.

“If therefore there is, as Mr. Berle suggests, a public consensus constantly forming on the growing end of American life, its formation, I suggest, is a testimony to the slow and subtle operation of that rational dynamism inherent in human nature, which is called natural law.”³⁵⁻³⁶

5) *Who forms the consensus and how*

The question—Who forms the public consensus and how?—has in large part already been answered. We have already noted that proposals for the consensus are formulated and articulated by “the wise and honest” and that those precepts of “the wise” which are widely and generally accepted by “the people” constitute the consensus for that people. Who, therefore, forms the consensus? Murray’s reply is disarmingly simple. “Those who care.”³⁷ Those among the people, including both “the wise” and those less intellectually endowed, who have no ‘invested interest but who nevertheless have a concern for the commonweal and study its welfare—these few ultimately determine the public consensus.³⁸

Perhaps this is the place to express Murray’s (and Berle’s) views with respect to the relation of the church and the modern university to the public consensus in today’s democratic society. Who today does the work of the feudal “Lords Spiritual” in determining the public consensus?

“It is not the function of the Church as such to elaborate the public consensus, which is a body of the rational knowledge, a structure of rational imperatives, that sustain and direct the action of the People Temporal and of their secular rulers. The proper task of the Church is the custody and development of the deposit of faith, which is a body of revealed truth, a structure of mystery, that sustains and directs the action of the People Spiritual. The public consensus is the property of the *studium*. . . . It is the function of the University, which

has a care both for the princes and for the people, to see that this duty is wisely performed. chiefly by defining what justice is, and what the freedom of the people requires, in changing circumstances. The University assembles these definitions and requirements into the public consensus."³⁹

Even though the church, therefore, may have the responsibility to use her authority to support the public consensus as a work of reason, Murray is quite blunt in asserting that the ultimate responsibility for the public consensus lies elsewhere. "The *sapientes* of whom St. Thomas speaks made their residence in the University, not in the Curia. They were not *domini* but *magistri*, not Lords, but Masters."⁴⁰ In Murray's view, therefore, the final responsibility for the public consensus in modern times lies with the university.⁴¹

In spite of their placing ultimate responsibility on the university for the public consensus in modern times it is important to note that neither Berle nor Murray limit membership among "the wise" to university professors. The reference is rather to the total academy and its associates in learning. Along with "careful university professors," Berle lists "specialists," "representative journalists," and "respected politicians" as those to be included among the *sapientes*.⁴² Murray is at equal pains not to limit "intellectuals" to academicians. He would include politicians, writers, journalists, clergy, and "the whole range of men and women equipped by formal education and training to take an intelligent interest in the *res publica*." These are the people, he explains, "who are supposed to be in conscious possession of the public philosophy as a philosophy; for them it would be a personal acquisition and not simply a patrimony."⁴³

6) *Attending considerations*

Let me call attention briefly to just a very few scattered facets of the Berle-Murray concept of public consensus on the basis that these factors may prove important to our later consideration of campus consensus.

First, both Berle and Murray consider freedom of assembly, speech and press to be essentially *social* (as opposed to individual) freedoms in a democratic society because of their essentiality to an ever evolving and developing public consensus. On modern campuses the emphasis too often falls elsewhere. Freedoms of assembly, speech, and press are frequently discussed more in terms of

their providing opportunity for individual or group self-realization or self-fulfillment. While Berle-Murray would undoubtedly not deny the latter benefits of the freedoms mentioned, it is very doubtful that they would rate the individual benefit ahead of the social necessity, at least where the public, political consensus is at stake.

Second, it is well to note the phenomenon of public consensus provides a tremendous stabilizing factor to a democratic people. Concepts which are basic to the consensus are not quickly or easily changed. When Murray uses the term "dynamic" to describe the unfolding character of the natural law he does not imply that the realities or verities of the natural law unravel in any dazzling, spectacular brilliance. With respect to public consensus the unfolding is gradual and slow; its acceptance by the people is frequently allowed only begrudgingly. Murray uses the expression "slow and subtle" to describe this natural phenomenon. In other contexts the two concepts, "slow and subtle" alongside of "dynamic," might be considered more opposites than complementaries.

Third, institutionalization of the public consensus provides a further stabilizing factor. Cracks in bells, statues, eternal flames, flags, and buildings all become symbols for ideas which are more basic to the consensus and probably serve as well to preserve those ideas in the public mind as do laws, constitutions, and forms of government. The total "way of life" of a people itself becomes an institution, and perhaps ultimately the strongest institution to stabilize the political consensus.

Unfortunately the tremendous stabilizing factors of the public consensus, operating to protect minorities (and at times the majority) from the judgments of private consciences as well as from a rapid and emotional change of the public mind, likewise can serve to preserve elements of injustice that inevitably become a part of a people's way of life.

Finally, Murray dismisses rather abruptly the preoccupation of so many Americans with the immanent threat of Communism, at least as it poses a threat to the American public consensus. Murray is far more concerned with the gradual decay of the American public consensus from within. He fears a developing American "political bankruptcy." Communism, he would maintain

"is not the basic cause of our present confusions, uncertainties, insecurities, falterings and failures of purpose. I would go so

far as to maintain that, if the Communist empire were to fall apart tomorrow, and if Communist ideology were to disintegrate with it, our problems would not be solved. In fact, they would be worse in many ways."⁴⁴

PART II. CAMPUS CONSENSUS

At the beginning of this paper I remarked that current campus unrest might well be attributed to a breakdown in campus consensus. I went on to state that if this analysis of the present campus situation could be shown to be valid, I would be prepared to defend the thesis that campus consensus is just about the most interesting and important thing that can be discussed in relation to any particular university or college. Part II of this paper, therefore, will be broken into two sections. In the first section I shall address myself to factors which contribute to the current campus unrest showing how so many circumstances which prevail on our campuses today—student numbers and character, campus barbarism, and the collapse of campus authority—all emanate from or contribute to a breakdown in campus consensus. In the second section I will discuss matters which are essential to an understanding and formation of a new campus consensus indicating that this particular consideration is “just about the most interesting and important thing that can be discussed” as applied to any particular university or college.

A. Breakdown of Campus Consensus

The American university is faced today with a situation which, I am sure, has no parallel in the history of higher education. The problems engendered by these unfamiliar circumstances have never before been faced by university administrations. I personally feel that a good share of the campus unrest might reasonably be attributed to the efforts of university officers and faculty to handle the new and unique problems of our day by traditional means which are not only inadequate but completely inappropriate for the problems at hand.

1) Students: numbers, backgrounds, attitudes, expectations

When we approach the various problems with which our campuses are presently confronted the very first thing to consider is the sheer numbers of students that are involved. The great American educational experiment, education for all, has now reached the

university level. Our nation is committed to making a university education more and more available to an ever increasing percentage of our youth. Currently almost six million young people are enrolled in our American universities. It can reasonably be expected that the number will double in the next ten to twenty years. No nation in history has ever had to deal with such a sizable percentage of its citizens engaged in higher education. Simply in terms of numbers the student population of the United States already constitutes a significant *force* to be dealt with not only in national affairs but particularly in terms of the educational process itself. Student *power* cannot but become an ever increasing factor in our nation's educational determinations.

Second, the record of student involvements in the past ten years leads one to expect that the present and future student generations will not be particularly patient with an educational system that, in their opinion, is not responding to immediate societal needs. In the last decade, in the sixties, American students have for the first time involved themselves in national affairs—particularly in civil rights, poverty, and foreign policy movements—in a manner unprecedented in American history. Their fourth cause, that of educational adaptation and reform, has already had a widespread impact on American campuses. There is no reason to expect any abatement of student pressure in any of these four areas. Quite the contrary, in view of the impact which students feel they have already made on American society there is every reason to expect that student causes not only will be broadened in the years ahead but will be urged with increasing intensity. I personally feel that what historians may some day refer to as the "Student Era" of American history has only just begun.

Third, impatience and impetuosity will undoubtedly increasingly characterize students and student movements in the years ahead. At its worst this impetuosity will manifest itself in most violent forms. At its very least, student impatience will demonstrate an increasing demand that students be allowed to play a more self-determining role in their own education. This latter demand will be "non-negotiable" and will pertain to all facets of university life, both curricular and co-curricular. Moreover, there will be no hiding from these developments on campuses which seek to be isolated either by location or ideology. Modern communications have made any isolation impossible. Students on the smallest and most remote campuses will sense the pulse of the more

general attitudes and movements and bring their force to the most isolated campus.

Fourth, students will increasingly adopt a new "idea of a university" which will be less that of John Henry Newman and more that enunciated by John Courtney Murray. Murray describes the university as

"that social institution whose function it is to bring the resources of reason and intelligence to bear, through all the disciplines of learning and teaching, on the problems of truth and understanding that confront society because they confront the mind of man."⁴⁵

There is no need to argue a possible reconciliation of these two "ideas of a university." It is only important to note that the student mentality will become increasingly impatient with an "ivory tower" concept of education and will insist that education assist them *now* in addressing themselves to the problems which confront men *today*.

It is not intended as critical to remark that the traditional means of university administration and governance were never intended and are not particularly suited to handle the entirely new, complicated, and unforeseeable set of problems brought to our campuses today by such vast numbers of students with such unprecedented student histories, attitudes, and educational expectations. To say that there is little understanding on the campus today—and a great deal of misunderstanding—is unquestionably an understatement. That there is little agreement—and a great deal of disagreement—as to educational purpose and the means to achieve educational goals, cannot be surprising. If these things are true it seems obvious enough to say that there exists little if any educational consensus on campuses today. This is simply to say that there is little common understanding of what higher education is all about. There are few basic ideas or value judgments regarding higher education which are accepted as self-evident to all concerned. Campus consensus has broken down under the pressures of the problems, largely of the larger society, which students bring with them as they approach their university experience.

2) *Campus barbarism*

Perhaps every American university and college has always been held together by its respective consensus (and not by just its heat-

ing plant), although the matter has been of little consequence until recent years. Even the great change in American education from the classical to vocational curricula did not challenge the basic consensus of early American education—that a small number of youths from a predetermined group would be prepared by a predetermined curriculum to acquire a predetermined character so they could assume predetermined responsibilities in a society which it was presumed would always remain unchanging and predictable. It is only in very recent years that the “predetermined” syndrome of American education has been successfully challenged and with it the entire body of ideas, assumptions, prejudices and criteria of judgment which constituted earlier American campus consensus.

Perhaps it is overstating the case to say that until recent times the “campus consensus” existed largely in the minds of the trustees and president, and perhaps in the mind of the larger public. It makes no difference. Everybody agreed, even the students, to the function, means, and goals of higher education in our earlier American history. Campus protests and riots were directed against particular persons or rulings, not against the basic understandings of the educational process.

Student unrest today bears a far different stamp. Students now are questioning the most basic understandings of yesterday’s universally accepted educational consensus. There is nothing of yesterday’s educational process that students will accept today as self-evident. The most radical students despair of American education doing anything but reinforcing the value system of a society which they consider outlived and decadent. Other students of the left see American education today as a medium without a message, quite astute in teaching them the means by which truth may be pursued but most inept in explaining how to recognize or know the truth when and if it is ever found. More moderate students look toward the truth their education purportedly presents (and perhaps toward the fellowmen their education inexplicably ignores) with passing disdain as they plan new uses of their education to improve their personal life’s fortune.

All of this points to the apparent fact that on American campuses today there is little indication that an educational consensus actually exists. Behind the marble academic facade there is little agreement—or what is even more significant, there is little rational disagreement—on what ultimately the American educational effort is all about. The result is that our American campuses currently

present an almost completely unoccupied territory in which the modern barbarian can roam.

The modern barbarian, whether in a Brooks Brothers suit or dirty T-shirt with dungarees, is doing his work well on American campuses. Rational dissent has been either discarded as too time consuming or predetermined as hopeless. Non-negotiable demands replace petition. Threats replace argument. Office occupation and even dynamite replace reason. A rule of raw physical power threatens to desecrate the sanctuary of intelligence.

Perhaps the most amazing facet of the barbarian's success on the modern American campus is the dramatization it provides of the complete lack of campus consensus. It is not really the barbarian that is the scandal to American education at the present time. Rather, the scandal lies in the confusion of the campus multitude which seems quite incapable of determining precisely why the barbarian is at fault. The academic powers seem incapable of providing a truly academic response. The most serious objection on the part of academe seems to be that the barbarians are interfering with the more "businesslike" students getting on with their education. The barbarian is causing inconvenience and loss of time, and so he must be wrong. However typically American such reasoning might be, by academic standards it is more barbaric than that of the barbarian. Such a response by the down-to-business "scholars" is scarcely rational and only serves to demonstrate the lack of a deeply thought out, academic consensus on the modern university campus. As Murray points out, it is not an easy thing rationally to disagree. Today's scholars seem as incapable of *rational* disagreement as do the barbarians.

One wonders about the relation of today's more violent campus disruptions to the campus consensus, if indeed a consensus can be presumed to exist on many campuses. The turmoil is sparked in most cases by an unbelievably small minority of students, abetted by a small number of faculty, and encouraged usually by only an insignificant group of sympathizers. Meanwhile, where is the vast majority of the campus community which should at very least regard with disdain this obvious violation of academic style or character? It is sobering indeed to realize that the vast majority has little if any realization as to what academic style or character precisely is or should be. If this is true, serious campus disruptions merely provide a sign indicating a far more serious malady that afflicts American academe. The disruptions provide one

further indication to highlight a lack of serious, academic, campus consensus. They demonstrate that in the American academe there are very few basic understandings and value judgments which all members of the academic community regard as self-evident.

3) *Campus authority*

The state of authority on American campuses today further illustrates the current breakdown of campus consensus. Authority always operates within, and draws its vitality from, a societal consensus. Authority functions properly only in a society where it is accepted and respected by everybody involved in its operation, both those exercising the authority and those expected to obey. The proper functioning of authority, therefore, presupposes an agreement on fundamental values. If this is so, authority can hardly be expected to function where campus consensus has ceased to exist.

Murray shrewdly observes that "a human society is inhumanly ruled if it is ruled by fear."⁴⁶ An inhuman exercise of authority, rule by fear, cannot long endure, at very least not today on an American campus. Campus rule must, therefore, take its ultimate stand on some basis other than fear, and what other basis is there except consensus? And how can there be rule by consent except within the bounds of a consensus, that is, within an area in which students have agreed that it is reasonable that they should be ruled? If respect for authority today runs thin on our American campuses, is the disrespect itself the illness or is it only a sign of something more fundamental that is amiss: a loss of campus consensus?

B. The Most Interesting and Important Thing About a University

In the preceding section I have explained—in terms of student numbers and character, campus barbarism, and the collapse of campus authority—why a great deal of the unrest found on our campuses today must be attributed to a breakdown in campus consensus. In times of great societal change such as we are presently experiencing, it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish widespread agreement on the educational goals which are appropriate to the times. If there is disorder on our campuses it is because there is a far deeper confusion in attempting to explain what modern education is all about. The unrest will die and its symptoms dis-

appear only as a new consensus emerges, a new set of ideas and basic value judgments, which receive wide and general acceptance in the academic society. The emerging of a new campus consensus, as elements develop and unfold on particular campuses, will without question be the most interesting and important thing about university life in the years ahead.

1) *What is campus consensus?*

Any particular campus consensus is made up of that largely intangible body of principles, tenets, rules, standards, and criteria of judgment which ultimately determine what is acceptable and what is unacceptable in the academic community. Berle and Murray both refer to public consensus as a "set of ideas" or "basic value judgments." In the academic context there must exist a set of basic standards which comprise the campus consensus and according to which all other ideas are judged and values determined in the academic society. Since the campus consensus is the ultimate determining factor with respect to the rightness or wrongness of human acts in the academic community, its determination could be described as "an exercise in campus morality." Its emergence demonstrates an effort to establish a "campus philosophy."

If the concept of campus consensus parallels the analysis of public consensus reported by Berle and Murray in the first part of this paper, it is of interest and the greatest importance to note that the set of ideas or basic value judgments which comprise the consensus are not only reached by human reason but draw their strength, vitality, authority, and finally their wide acceptance precisely from the fact that they are a product of reason and intelligence. A campus consensus, therefore, cannot be imposed "from above" by campus authority. As with public consensus, campus consensus is quite independent of campus opinion (majority or minority), campus policy, and "secondary rationalizations based on behavioral data" or "residual minimums that cannot be doubted." The campus consensus is not an experiment in campus participatory democracy or an on-going campus experience in group situation ethics. Ultimately campus consensus is a product of reason and intelligence applied to problems of the academic community. It finds its general acceptance in that society precisely because it is reasonable and intelligent. It is made up of those basic ideas and value judgments which the academic community judges to make the most common sense in the existing educational experience.

As with public consensus, campus consensus is formulated in what Murray terms the fourth area of moral consciousness or moral reason. Answers to the problems confronted in this fourth area are neither immediately apparent to the human intellect (as are those in the second area) nor reached by *simple* reasoning (as are those in the third area). Problems of the academic society confronted in the fourth area present difficulties which require not only profound reasoning but experience as well, and not infrequently such additional detailed, specialized, and technical knowledge as can only be provided by more specialized disciplines, particularly psychology and the other behavioral sciences.

2) *How is the campus consensus formed*

There is no reason to believe that the campus consensus does not follow the same two-level pattern of formation and development as does the public consensus. Basically, therefore, the campus consensus is determined by "those [in the university community] who care." As with the public consensus, "those who care" function on two distinct levels. The ideas and value judgments which are ultimately incorporated into the campus consensus by their wide and general acceptance in the university community must first be formulated and articulated by "the wise and honest" members of the community. But who in the university context are "the wise" (*sapientes*)? This is not an easy question to decide since the only honest answer seems to involve a vicious circle. "The wise" are certainly not predetermined by any official position in the university community. All that can be said is that "the wise" are those whose ideas and value judgments in fact win wide respect and general acceptance in the university community. Within the community itself "the wise" cannot be identified in any other way than by the reasonableness and intelligence of their articulated ideas and judgments. The *sapientes* of the university community, therefore, are ultimately those whose ideas and value judgments are thought to make the most sense in explaining the current over-all educational experience.

In the university community there will undoubtedly be much less of a distinction between "the wise" and the ordinary community members than can be expected between the two levels in the case of the public consensus. And perhaps "the wise" in the university situation comprise less "a class apart" than they do in civil society. Unquestionably too there exists on the university

campus divisions and subdivisions of "the wise" as judgments are presented on various specialized and highly technical questions.

Although the point is obvious it is perhaps advisable explicitly to state that even in a sectarian school there is little likelihood that university officers and religious will in the future automatically (or *ex officio*, as it were) be counted among "the wise" by the university community. The point is important because it indicates the subtle but ever so certain shift of power which is already occurring on all university and college campuses. Ultimate power, the force which ultimately determines campus style and character, will lie indirectly either in the campus consensus itself or in the hands of those who determine the consensus development. Campus authority, however otherwise constituted, will ultimately have to come to terms with the campus consensus and not *vice versa*.

What is said here in reference to "the wise" is by no means meant to be intimidating to university officers or to religious members of a university community. Temporarily, in a period of transition, the prospect may appear threatening. It need not really be so. Perhaps the difference will lie mainly in the fact that in a more deferential age university officers and religious were *a priori* presumed, in some cases almost exclusively, to comprise the campus *sapientes*. Such a presumption can no longer be expected. On most campuses it has already been challenged and discarded. It should immediately be noted, however, that there is no intrinsic reason why university officers and religious cannot surmount the challenge and in their own individual right win the esteem of the university community and be counted among "the honest and wise." It should, in fact, be expected that they will do so.

3) *The student role*

As I have already indicated, I feel that it is inevitable that the governance of American universities and colleges will evolve into forms which will accommodate themselves to the determination of ultimate campus norms and values by campus consensus rather than by any other means. One of the reasons why I feel this change to be inevitable is that campus consensus provides the only reasonable response—a response particularly apt to a democratic society, it might be noted—to the current student demand for student autonomy.

Student power on our American campuses has increasingly

gathered its force behind the demand for student autonomy, that is, ultimate and completely independent student self-government. The demand for student autonomy represents, perhaps, an over-reaction to the *in loco parentis* philosophy which for so long characterized the relationship between administration and students on American campuses. In more recent years it has evolved from a program which originally sought a student union with faculty to oppose administration, the obvious (to students) great enemy of all campus freedoms and the group responsible for the (obvious, to students) fact that American education reinforces all that is evil in our American society. However, the students subsequently divorced themselves from the proposed union with faculty in this great cause when they found that large, well-entrenched, and overly involved gatherings of faculty were as guilty as administrators, perhaps even more so, in resisting efforts to change the academic *status quo*. Student autonomy appeared the only idealistic response to the many obvious evils which beset the educational establishment.

Student autonomy, however, has fallen a victim of its own excesses. General student reaction to the unreasonableness of student radicalism may have been slow to form, but it has formed and ultimately, I am certain, will seek an accommodation with administration and faculty which is in accord with the highest academic purpose. Although outside pressures are serving to move students in this same direction the main force will ultimately come from the students themselves as they realize that student autonomy in effect leads to student chaos. Student autonomy will have served its purpose in the minds of the vast majority of American students if it has brought about the overthrow of authoritarian governance on our campuses. Students will undoubtedly accept a form of governance which must come to terms with campus consensus.

I do not want to oversimplify. The student energies presently supporting student autonomy are tremendous. The direction of the movement will not easily be changed. If there is to be an accommodation in campus governance to campus consensus for the determination of final norms and values for all *facets* of university life, student life included, guarantees will have to be provided to protect against a resurgence of authoritarian ways on the part of both administration and faculty. (Such guarantees have already begun to be formulated in Statements on Student Rights and Freedoms and student Bills of Rights.) When I speak, therefore, of

campus governance by forms which can be accommodated to campus consensus I speak of an eventual outcome which is still some years away—some very unpleasant and frustrating years away, it might be added. It is only that the time may be shortened and the experience made less painful and humanly less expensive if the ultimate achievement can be brought into focus.

What will be the role of students in university governance which accommodates itself to campus consensus? First, although no charisma of wisdom will be automatically accorded student leaders by the university community, it can reasonably be presumed that from time to time particularly insightful students will merit being counted among “the wise and honest” whose judgments in an area of their particular competence will receive wide and general acceptance by the community at large. Ordinarily, however, “the students who care”—and this will be equally true of university officers and faculty “who care”—will be among those who comprise the basic community which determines what precise ideas and value judgments, proposed by “the wise,” are to be incorporated into the campus consensus. The importance of the student rule in this process is not to be underestimated. Spelled out this means that the ideas and value judgments of the *sapientes* must make sense to students before they will be incorporated into the campus consensus.

How can a university reasonably provide that student insights will be adequately reflected in the determination of the campus consensus? First, there can be no doubt that universities will be moving more and more toward *tri-parte* government through administration-faculty-student representation on even the highest governing committees and boards. These forums will provide one means whereby student insights will be reflected in the formation of an evolving campus consensus. However, of far greater importance will be the rights guaranteed students of free association, speech, publication, invitations to campus speakers, and the like. Ordinarily these particular freedoms are considered important because they complement the basic student academic freedoms, freedom of inquiry and freedom of expression. However, in a university which aspires to governance in accordance with a true campus consensus the “complementary freedoms” take on an entirely new aspect. They become essential to the formation of a true campus consensus. They provide an indispensable means whereby student insights are reflected in the formation of the campus consensus.

It is important to note that I say *almost* complete freedom must be institutionally guaranteed to students in the areas which I describe as "complementary freedoms." I make this reservation because I do not see how absolute freedom (autonomy) can be allowed students in these areas without the university community abdicating its very serious and final responsibility to make absolutely certain that abuses do not seriously jeopardize the formation of a reasonable and intelligent campus consensus. It might help to understand my position in this matter if I repeat that I consider it appropriate that the freedoms under discussion be provided students *not* primarily as a means of their own academic development (insofar as they complement the basic academic freedoms of inquiry and expression), but *basically* because they serve an absolutely essential social need in a university community which is committed to campus consensus as an essential element of campus governance.

My position in this matter is quite similar to that of Berle and Murray who consider the freedoms of assembly, speech, and press in civil society as basically *social*, not individual, freedoms. They see these freedoms as essential to the formation of a reasonable and intelligent public consensus. They see them, therefore, primarily as serving the community welfare and only secondarily as important for the welfare of the individual. As a result they feel that the community has an ultimate responsibility to see that these freedoms serve their social purpose and that this responsibility cannot be abdicated. In the academic society, student freedoms—along with administration and faculty freedoms, it might be added—must be regarded in this same light. The university as a community cannot abdicate its final responsibility to see that student freedoms serve the community need in the formation of an intelligent and reasonable campus consensus whatever other function they might also serve in providing for individual student academic development.

CONCLUSION

My presentation has been bold, perhaps overly so. I have not hesitated to offer personal opinion and forecast where scholarly (and more humble) appraisal and conjecture would have been appropriate. Regardless, what is presented must stand ultimately on its merit. Far better minds and a few years' history will be the judge.

It would be interesting to further the analogy between public

consensus, as explained by Berle and Murray, and what I propose as campus consensus. The formation, development, and general acceptance of basic ideas and value judgments in the civil and academic societies have much in common. However, further explanation at this time would be premature. Enough has been said to introduce the concept of campus consensus into academic conversation where it can be discussed, argued, further investigated, and finally accepted or dismissed. Its final merit can only be judged by the "wide and general acceptance" of which it speaks.

In the body of my paper I have several times used the word "inevitable" when discussing the prospect of universities being governed by basic norms and values which are determined by campus consensus. I would like to conclude my paper by proposing two reasons why I feel the prospect is inevitable.

First, and to this I have already referred, university government according to norms and values established by university consensus provides, as I see it, the only logical and reasonable response that can be offered to the current student demand for student autonomy. If the campus consensus is formed in the same manner as Berle-Murray explain the formation of the public consensus, the resulting university governance will not represent a capitulation to student power, or a reestablishment of administrative authoritarianism, or an unsatisfying and unstable compromise between the two. Quite the contrary, it will represent something fresh and new in American education, a form of governance which is peculiarly apt not only for the academic society itself but for a community which aspires to prepare youth to participate actively in a larger, fully democratic society. On this score I personally see the trend toward university governance according to consensus, a movement which I consider to be already well under way, as a wholesome academic development.

Second, I feel that university governance according to campus consensus is inevitable because I know of no other form of governance which would be appropriate to a society which, with deep humility and self-respect, must logically claim an autonomy for itself, a freedom from all outside influence and interference, and this in order that it might better serve the other societies from which it demands this autonomy. Such a society must logically seek within itself the means of its own governance.

University governance according to campus consensus bespeaks

a confidence which, I feel, is appropriate to an academic community. The confidence is actually in the reasonableness and intelligence of the many people on our American campuses "who care." It trusts that in our academic societies we will produce men who are "honest and wise," men who will ponder the problems which currently so afflict our campuses, men who will seek in our campus communities associates with whom they can refine, develop, and deepen their ideas through campus argument, men who will humbly enunciate the norms and values which they feel are essential to the academic community in which they work and live. Governance according to campus consensus expresses the further confidence that "those who care" in the general university community will give wide and general acceptance only to norms and values which in the academic context reflect the highest reasonableness and intelligence.

The concept of campus consensus does not propose that today or even tomorrow the university community will provide itself with all the answers to all the problems with which it is faced. It only proposes that we look beyond the problems and seek a common basic wisdom in accordance with which today's problems and tomorrow's can be approached.

REFERENCES

1 Murray, John Courtney, *We Hold These Truths* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), p. 9.

2 Berle, Adolf A., Jr., *Power Without Property: A New Development in American Political Economy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959).

3 Berle, *Power*, p. 111. Berle continues: Introduction of the concept of "public consensus" is more than a mere dialectic necessity in erecting a theory of economic power under the American system. Public consensus, though it is indefinite, is a hard-core fact. Every corporation executive knows this. Public relations departments and counselors of most of the large economic organisms continuously grapple with it. . . . The "public consensus" is the body of general, unstated premises which come to be accepted. It furnishes the basis for public opinion.

4 Berle, *Power*, p. 111. Berle continues: "Public opinion" is sometimes misleadingly used as a synonym [for public consensus]. Actually, public opinion is a shorthand phrase expressing the fact that a large body of the community has reached or may reach specific conclusions in some particular situation. These conclusions are spontaneously, perhaps emotionally, reached, usually from unstated but very real premises. . . . Public opinion is the specific application of the tenets embodied in the public consensus to some situation which has come into general consciousness.

5 Berle *Power*, pp. 111-112.

6 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 104.

7 Murray summarizes Berle's thought on this matter (*These Truths*, p. 104): The reach of the consensus goes "over and beyond the accepted or enacted provisions of the law"; it imposes standards of performance and conduct whose violation may lead to political or legal intervention. In this same sense these standards are "inchoate law," which may become "explicit law in case of abuse of power." Thus consensus furnishes the premises that justify governmental intervention in the economy, whether in the form of "investigation, enactment of a relevant statute, or emergence of a new rule through the common-law courts."

8 Berle, *Power*, pp. 6-7.

9 Berle, (*Power*, p. 7) speculates that "at the moment universities in America and their companion institutions of learning are the logical recipients of the mantle of the historical Lords Spiritual." The importance of American universities and their companion institutions of learning with respect to the public consensus cannot, therefore, be overestimated.

Conversely, the importance of freedom, and responsible autonomy, for the university cannot be overestimated. It is precisely because of the importance of public consensus to a people, Berle points out, that we need universities. "It is also the reason why the minute you undermine their freedom, you lose the one quality you want most: the absolute independence of their judgment."

10 Berle, *Power*, p. 110.

11 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 97.

12 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 98. Let me gather together in a single footnote a long list of the meanings and connotations which Murray declares inappropriate to the classical and traditional meaning of the word "consensus." The list is from both Berle and Murray.

Today, of course, the word is often taken to mean simply "majority opinion," which is the supreme category in which men have lately come to think when there is question of the political order. There is also the frequent meaning, reflected in *Webster's Dictionary*, where the word is defined: "Agreement in matters of opinion, testimony, etc.; accord, loosely, the convergent trend, as of opinion."

Citing Berle, Murray explains that, "The consensus is not 'majority opinion,' certainly not in its origins; the Lords Spiritual are not a majority. Again, the consensus is not the 'convergent trend of opinion.' It supposes a process of thought and argument; but is itself the term of this process, reached when 'doctrine solidifies,' and 'consensus is reached.' Moreover, the doctrine is the rational term of the argument, a proper conclusion; it is not simply the least-common-denominator residue of a collation of opinions. And it looks for its validity, not to the sheer fact that the Lords Spiritual, or the people at large agree on it, but to the evidence adduced to show that it is true or good or just or equitable or useful or necessary. The agreement is consequent on the constitution of the doctrine. It is expected that men who examine the evidence will come to an agreement on the doctrine. In the end, of course, the consensus implies public agreement, though its origins may lie in the reasoned affirmation of one man or of a university seminar; but the consensus itself, formally considered, is not sheerly the public agreement. It is a doctrine or a judgment that commands public agreement on the merits of the arguments for it. (Murray, *These Truths*, p. 97)

13 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 80.

14 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 9.

15 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 13.

16 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 12. In the continuing text Murray reveals a penetrating insight into human psychology. "One is, I take it, on the brink of impotence and nihilism when one begins to be aware of one's own awareness of what one is doing, saying, thinking. This is the paralysis of all serious thought; it is likewise the destruction of all the spontaneities of love."

17 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 12.

18 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 12.

19 Murray, *These Truths*, pp. 11-12. It is impossible to overstress Murray's appreciation of the essentiality of dissent in a democratic society since his whole view of civility and civilization centers about man's attaining the conditions of rational dialogue—which certainly presumes the possibility of dissent. Murray defines civilization as "men locked in argument." It is through rational, civil argument that a people become a political community. It is only through men being able civilly to disagree that civility emerges and identity is achieved.

Conversely, through loss of consensus a people loses its identity. For instance, through loss of consensus the American people could lose their identity and self-ness. "The peril is great. The complete loss of one's identity is, with all propriety of theological definition, hell. In diminished forms it is insanity. And it would not be well for the American giant to go lumbering about the world today, lost and mad." (p. 6)

Disagreement, Murray points out, "is not an easy thing to reach." (p. 15) Rational disagreement requires intellectual discipline and is a mark of high civility. The barbarian is one who would destroy all rational disagreement. Murray argues, for example, that the secularist dissent from the American consensus, a thoroughly rational dissent, "illustrates the existence of the American affirmation," or serves to "affirm the consensus." (p. 30)

20 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 81.

21 The apparent current disfavor in some quarters with which some hold the scholastic method and the entire natural law approach to an understanding of human nature and the problems with which mankind is confronted will be referred to later. Cf. reference #36.

22 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 109.

23 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 109.

24 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 109.

25 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 110.

26 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 110.

27 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 111.

28 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 101. Murray describes the American political consensus as "an ensemble of substantive truths, a structure of basic knowledge, an order of elementary affirmations that reflect realities inherent in the order of existence. It occupies an established position in society and excludes opinions alien or contrary to itself. This consensus is the institutional *a priori* of all the rationalities and technicalities of constitutional and statutory law. It furnishes the premises of the people's action in history and defines the larger aims which that action seeks in internal affairs and in external relations." (*These Truths*, p. 9)

"It was such a body of substantive truths which our forefathers held to be self-evident." "The American Proposition rests on the more traditional conviction that there are truths; that they can be known; that they can be held; for, if they are not held, assented to, consented to, worked into the texture of institutions, there can be no hope of founding a true city, in which men may dwell with dignity, peace, unity, justice, well-being, freedom." (*These Truths*, p. ix)

24 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 80.

30 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 120.

31 It is in connection with public consensus that Murray speaks of society as "a creation of the soil." The many illogicalities which are the product of man's humaneness and shrewdness only serve, Murray maintains, to affirm the rational character of the consensus. "Every particular society is a creature of the soil; it springs from the physical soil of the earth and from the more formative soil of history. Its existence is sustained by loyalties that are not logical; its ideals are expressed in legends that go beyond the facts and are for that reason vehicles of truth; its cohesiveness depends in no small part on the materialisms of property and interest. Though all this is true, nevertheless the distinctive bond of the civil multitude is reason which is argument." (*These Truths*, p. 7)

32 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 117. Emphasis added.

33 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 118.

34 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 99.

35 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 121. Murray's explanation of one particular development in American civil rights legislation illustrates the open-ended, dynamic quality of natural law. Murray explains that the "separate but equal" legislation of the early part of the twentieth century was "always unjust [since] radical discrimination cannot be defended on moral grounds." However, in the early-twentieth century, Murray maintains the "separate but equal" legalism was defensible as law—"in view of the unenlightened state of the public mind, the temporary cultural inferior status of the Negro, etc." This whole situation has "slowly and subtly" evolved, however, to a position where "separate but equal" legislation must today not only be regarded as immoral and unjust—as it always was—but as also completely indefensible in law. (*These Truths*, p. 145)

36 The author is not a philosopher and even less a historian of philosophy. Perhaps

he strays too far from his armchair when he remarks that, in his humble estimation, a great deal of the disfavor and ill repute (cf. reference #21) with which Thomism, scholasticism, and the entire natural law philosophy are today regarded in some quarters is a result to a great extent from the natural law being perceived, and at times presented, as something rigid and static. Murray insists that the natural law is a dynamic, "open ended" concept since it is based on the dynamic nature of man himself whose world is always opening to greater understanding and intelligibility.

37 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 13.

38 The number of men who qualify a "the wise and honest" is, in Murray's view, relatively small. "Society is rescued from chaos only by a few men, not by the many. *Paucis humanum civit genus.*" It is only the few who understand the disciplines of civility and are able to sustain them in being and thus hold in check the forces of barbarism that are always threatening to force the gates of the city. To say this is not, of course, to endorse the concept of the fascist elite—a barbarous concept, if ever there was one. It is only to recall a lesson of history to which our own era of mass civilization may well attend. We have not been behind our forebears in devising both gross and subtle ways of massacring ancient civilities. (p. 13)

39 Murray, *These Truths*, pp. 121-122.

40 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 122.

41 Murray's further comments on this matter explain the relation he sees between the university and the church in the development of the public consensus in the modern democratic society. "In the fulfillment of its function the University often had the support of the Church, since her freedom and justice are integral to the *res sacra* that is committed to her. The Second Lateran Council, for instance, in 1139, blasted 'the insatiable rapacity of moneylenders,' and threatened them with denial of Christian burial. But the argument about usury was carried on by the Masters. It was they who elaborated the fencing restrictions to be thrown about the growing power of money, in the name of justice. They did the work of reason, of reflection on the changing economic facts. It was not a 'spiritual' but an 'intellectual' task. The spiritual task was done by the Church, when she supported by her authority the work of reason. Sitting in Council, the Lords Spiritual confirmed the work of the Masters who sat in the Study." (*These Truths*, p. 122)

42 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 103.

43 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 86. Murray's definition of a university provides a clear explanation of why he sees its work to be so interrelated with the formation and development of the public philosophy. "By the university I mean here that social institution whose function it is to bring the resources of reason and intelligence to bear through all the disciplines of learning and teaching on the problems of truth and understanding that confront society because they confront the mind of man himself." (*These Truths*, p. 126)

44 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 88.

45 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 126.

46 Murray, *These Truths*, p. 167.

Lay Witness: The Qualifications for Contemporary Impact

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

PROOEMIUM

This paper is divided into two parts, and in this prooemium I want to explain the rationale of this division.

My understanding is that the assignment in preparing this paper was to spell out the qualifications that the layman, as distinguished from the Jesuit, could and should bring to the Jesuit university community in order to have significant contemporary impact.

The university seems to me to be essentially academic but, as with all things existential, to involve many non-essential (but significant) aspects. In the first part of my paper I try to look to what is *essential* to the Jesuit university as a Catholic institution of higher education. In the second part I look to certain aspects of the Jesuit university community which are non-essential but significant.

The qualifications needed by the layman if he is to have meaningful impact on the essential enterprise of the Jesuit university are determined by what the Jesuit university in its essence should be. In my opinion there is an essential difference, i.e., a difference in academic planning and execution of academic plans, between what the Jesuit university should be and what the non-Catholic university is. At the same time, not all of us agree on the determination of this difference. Thus I must first spell out my understanding of what this difference is before I can suggest the qualifications needed by the layman if he is to have a significant impact on the essential enterprise of the Jesuit university.

Once this is done (and this will take up much of my effort in this paper), and I am ready to say what qualifications the layman can and should bring to the task at hand, I find for the most part no great difference between the layman and the Jesuit.

In the second part of my paper, where I focus upon the non-essential aspects of life in the Jesuit campus, I do find more easily certain special qualifications that the layman can and should bring to the total university experience.

PART I

It is difficult to talk about the *nature* of the university, since the university is not a natural entity but rather a work of art. As

such, it is designed by men, brought into existence by men, and sustained in existence by men. Under the circumstances I suppose it can be anything that men want it to be and make it to be. Still, it would make little sense unless it were built and sustained to serve a determinate purpose, a purpose which somehow controls both its design and the character of the agents (and their instruments) who execute the demands of this design in bringing it into existence and in sustaining it in its being. I take it that we are agreed that there is a significant human purpose to be served by what we call the university and that we will participate in the JEA Workshop in order to focus on this purpose, to see it with as much clarity as we can, and from this vision to move to a vision of what the university must be and do to realize this purpose.

In putting this as simply as I have I realize that I am open to misunderstanding. I cannot mean that there is one purpose able to be easily seen and simply stated, which itself dictates a simple scheme for *the* university to which we can easily and readily agree and from which we can move into easy and unambiguous action as operating university communities. The purpose which ultimately defines the university is not simply one; it is complex and multiple, although the multiplicity of the finality which shapes the university must—it seems to me—be reducible in some sophisticated fashion to a system of goals which have as a system a certain unity. Further, the purposes to be served by the university are human purposes located within the context of historical flux. They must be seen as open to revision to meet the evolving demands of the existential situation. In addition, we must realize that though the end sets limits to the means, there may well be several legitimate options open as far as means to a given end are concerned. And finally, we should understand that we will not easily see the purposes and design in terms of which the university is to be defined, and even when we do achieve this vision the movement from the order of intention to that of execution will be difficult at best.

Of course, we are gathered at this Workshop not to reflect on the nature of the university simply taken, but more precisely on the nature of the Jesuit university. I presume that at the Workshop we will spend some of our time, possibly a great deal of our time, discussing the differences, if any, between "Jesuit," "Catholic," and "Christian" as these terms are used to modify "university." In this paper I will skirt this issue and speak for the most part simply of the Catholic university. What, if anything, is the Catholic

university? Can we speak meaningfully of it? If we can, how do we build it and how do we sustain it? If we can build and sustain it, should we? If we should, do we have the will to do so? These questions must be faced at our Workshop. The answers will not come easily but without answers to them, there is little sense in continuing the enterprise which brings us together to face them.

There are, of course, many stances which are taken, even by Catholics, on the question of the meaning of "Catholic university." Some argue that by definition a Catholic university is a contradiction in terms. They say that in one or more of a number of ways the Catholicity of the Catholic university must interfere with the freedom which is the life's blood of any university and, to the extent to which it does, it must diminish the authenticity of the Catholic university as a university. Some others, while holding that this need not happen, see no compelling reason why Catholics as Catholics should run a university but agree that, inasmuch as running a good university is a worthy human enterprise, Catholics as such might for good reason do so, much as they run hospitals, orphanages, and the like. Still others will insist that the Catholic university is, in terms of the academic, no different from any other university, but that existentially (for example, in terms of sponsorship by a religious order, or a preponderance of Catholics on the staff, or the presence of a campus liturgical life), it is different and Catholic. Others, while staunchly denying that Catholicity in any way diminishes the potential of the Catholic university as university, argue that while in all things directly academic save theology (and possibly philosophy) the Catholic university should be the same as other universities, nonetheless theology (and possibly philosophy) in the Catholic university represents a significant plus (added to sameness). Still another position on the Catholic university which is current claims no plus (i.e., does not claim that the presence of theology is a plus), but insists that in its academic orientation it is appropriately Christian without being any less a university and in being in this manner different gives witness to and celebrates the pluralism of modern society. I would like to argue for still another position, a position which borrows something from each of the preceding two positions, namely, that the Catholic university can be authentically a university, that its Catholicity represents a plus as we look to theology, and that its Catholicity simultaneously represents a difference in academic areas beyond that of theology.

If this is the case then clearly it is meaningful to speak of a Catholic university. Further, "Catholic" will be seen to modify "university" in a strong sense. By this I mean that it will add an essential specification (perhaps even an intensifying specification) and not simply suggest an accidental and *merely* existential modification. Further, it seems to me that if this is the case then rather clearly Catholic universities should be built and sustained, and we would be well advised to find the will to build and sustain them. Parenthetically, but certainly not unimportantly, the fact is that we would be hard pressed to find many (if any) universities which are Catholic (that is, fully so) in my sense of the term.

Whatever else it is, the university, as university, is a community of scholars dedicated to the search for, the preservation of, and the communication of truth. It could be pointed out that this is an oft-repeated description of the university which is susceptible to a simplistic and unsophisticated interpretation which would not only be inadequate but misleading. I am presuming that those who will use the paper will not impose this kind of interpretation on it. Truth is achieved—never easily, but, I submit, sometimes significantly—only in a personal commitment honestly made in the face of adequate evidence. The members of the university community must be free to go where they will in search for evidence and in the face of evidence freely to commit themselves in knowledge.

The Catholic faith is misunderstood if it is thought to place any *a priori* limits on a man's vision. The mind of man is open to all truth, and faith for any man is an invitation to a vision, which compared to the ordinary vision, is an enlarged vision. The man of authentic faith seeks truth wherever he can find it. His advantage is that he looks further and more deeply than others, and throughout his search he is aware that all things honestly earned in this search will finally be in full harmony. He is not so much a man with more answers as he is a man with more questions. He goes, without fear, where evidence takes him; but he has more evidences than his fellows. What he seeks he seeks not less freely than others; but he is inspired to seek for more. Only an inquiring and restless mind gives promise of great achievement. In one sense faith is a guarantee of intellectual restlessness and should, therefore, be the inspiration for full and free inquiry.

So also for the Catholic university. It can and must be all that any university is as a community of scholars in quest of truth. Whatever it has as something different, this can never be taken as

an excuse for being anything but excellent in all that it does precisely as a university. But under the influence of faith seeking understanding (*fides quaerens intellectum*), the Catholic university gives promise of being more than the ordinary university.

Accordingly, it seems to me that instead of a Catholic university being by definition a university-minus, i.e., minus something which the university as such should have, the Catholic university should be a university-plus, i.e., plus something which not only is in line with its essential orientation, but can be seen to intensify it.

At least one scholar¹ who has written convincingly on the nature of the Catholic university would dispute my point that the inclusion of sacred theology within the academic frame of the Catholic university represents something distinctive for the Catholic university as Catholic. He would argue that Harvard, Princeton, Chicago, and other universities have thriving departments of theology without thereby becoming what the Catholic university must be to be different enough to justify its distinct existence as Catholic. I am not quite sure how to confront this objection to my position. His point is well taken. Nonetheless as I look at the schools he points to and compare them with the model Catholic university I have in mind, it seems to me that there is a difference (because it can be experienced) between what theology effects in those institutions and what it should effect in the authentic Catholic university. Theology as an academic enterprise in the Catholic university must make its mark not only on the level of graduate research and certainly not merely as a discipline in which various theologies are studied and compared one with the other, no matter how honestly and on no matter how deep the level of scholarship. In the authentic Catholic university theology must be present in the academic frame in such fashion as to enrich the undergraduate as well as the graduate curriculum; and theology must be understood not simply as the study of theology or of theologies, but theology must be understood as that unique kind of academic enterprise which is principiated from an incommunicable faith commitment (by contrast with the communicable first principles from which the natural disciplines are generated). At the risk of seeming to attempt an easy escape from my difficulty, let me note that if any university which is not self-consciously a Catholic university were to fit theology into its academic structure in the way in which it seems to me the Catholic university, as Catholic, must, then that non-Catholic university would in fact enjoy the

plus I claim for the Catholic university. I would be willing then to retreat to a position which holds that the difference between it and the Catholic university is that the plus is demanded in the case of a Catholic university which lives up to its name and is a happy but non-essential bonus in the case of the non-Catholic university in question. Then, in terms of definition at least, the Catholic university remains a university-*plus*.²

It seems a mistake to suppose that the only difference in an authentically Catholic university is that to the ordinary areas of investigation and to the usual curriculum there is added theology (and perhaps an emphasis in philosophy). The fact of God-incarnate-in-Christ brings with it the imperative that in the Catholic university there be an intense and full concern for the phenomenon which is man, a passion to see man in his immanence and in his transcendence, to discover and to see in their full significance the totality of human values. Because of this the liberal subjects in general must retain a certain centrality in the Catholic university, with appropriate emphasis in those areas which are in one way or another especially sensitive to what might be spoken of as the Christian thrust—for example, in theology, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, economics, history, literature, psychology, and education.

There is a characteristically Catholic outlook on the world, on life, on man. The Church sees things from a certain perspective. If this is a legitimate perspective, it can stand honest academic critique, and the Catholic outlook should be enriched as a result of this critique. If it is illegitimate, it should be exposed to the critique which will reveal it as such. Beyond this it is the case, of course, that the Catholic outlook has significant implications in academic areas beyond that of theology. Whatever else Catholicity means it means that each man is uniquely a person, in himself inherently valuable, a center of great dignity and worth, with an openness through knowledge and love to other things, to other persons, and ultimately to God. The Christian image of man is of an individual situated within the social whole with a moral imperative simultaneously to perfect himself and this social whole in responsible acts of self-making. The person in society and the society of persons are perfectible entities whose perfection is the responsibility of each man. The fundamental purpose of the Catholic college as a teaching-learning institution would seem to be to enable its students to see what this means and to assist them

to achieve the "tools" with which, in an authentically profitable human fashion, to take themselves in hand and to make themselves and society fully free and integral. This is not to say that the Catholic college can teach virtue. However, to the extent to which the fully virtuous act is an intelligently informed act, it is possible and appropriate for the Catholic college in its academic orientation and its curricular frame to offer to its students the possibility for that information which makes possible the full flower of virtue.

According to the Catholic outlook man is by nature required to function ethically within the social and political sphere. He is naturally ethical-social-political without naturally knowing all that this implies and without naturally understanding the specifics of the problems and options for problem-resolution that he must understand to be integrally ethical-social-political. I see an imperative for the Catholic college, from the perspective of its Christian outlook but without begging any questions in an academically uncritical fashion, to focus in philosophy, sociology, politics, economics, history, literature, and the like on those topics whose study will enable the student to appreciate for himself the implications of the Christian stance and to grasp for himself the specifics he needs as far as human problems and the options for confronting and solving them are concerned. Since this is required for the fullness of freedom in the student, we are, of course, talking of a liberal education. A Catholic education, by definition, must be a liberal education.

What academic disciplines must there be in the curriculum of the Catholic university? There are some disciplines which belong in any university whether these disciplines have a special sensitivity to the Christian thrust or not. These, of course, must be found in the Catholic university. Mathematics is a prime example of a discipline with no special affinity to Catholicity which nonetheless must be in the over-all program of the Catholic university, precisely because it belongs in any university. Disciplines with a strong sensitivity to the Christian thrust belong in the Catholic college because it is Catholic. Thus philosophy, literature, sociology, economics, political science, history, and psychology must find places within the curriculum of the Catholic university. As a matter of fact, all of these belong in any university curriculum, so that they are doubly necessary in the Catholic school. The point is that they must be given special attention in the Catholic school; and care must be taken that, whatever other directions any one of

them takes in the Catholic university it is necessary that in some way each involve directions appropriate to man as seen in the Catholic perspective. Thus in philosophy, for one example, there *may* in the Catholic college be concentration in the philosophy of science or even in symbolic logic, but there *must* be a concentration in the philosophy of man and in ethics. There may be disciplines which are not required in every university but which, because they do have a special relationship to man as seen within the Christian context, should be in the curriculum of the Catholic school. Education seems to be an example of this type of discipline. Last, but surely not least, theology must have a significant place within the curriculum of the Catholic university, for reasons already given.

The Catholic university is, of course, *open* to any discipline, liberal or professional, which has academic respectability, regardless of whether the discipline in question is *demanded* by the Catholic university as university or as Catholic. Medicine seems to be an example of an academically respectable program which need not be in every university and which has no special sensitivity to the Christian thrust. Any Catholic university which can mount and maintain a good program in medicine might well do so, so long as it can maintain this program without serious sacrifice to the programs it is required to handle either because it is a university or because it is Catholic. However, no university has the resources to do everything. This is very true, these days, of our Catholic universities. Any Catholic university caught in a financial squeeze which would require it to maintain its school of medicine at serious expense to disciplines such as theology, philosophy, history—in general, its liberal disciplines—must decide to cut itself off from medicine for the sake of the health of those disciplines to which it is by definition as a Catholic university committed. What I am saying is that priorities must be set which honor the special character of the Catholic university, and these priorities must be scrupulously honored in the management of the Catholic university.

Now perhaps I am ready to speak of the qualifications needed by the layman if he is to have an appropriate impact within the contemporary Catholic university. Let it be understood that I am speaking of the impact of the layman on what is essential to the Catholic university, i.e., on the Catholic university as an *academic* enterprise, an enterprise which, by definition involves both a *plus* and a *difference* by way of comparison with the ordinary university. The Catholic university community includes trustees, admin-

istrators, faculty, and students. Together they must share the vision of what the authentic Catholic university is; they must see what is needed in order to implement this vision; they must have the talent necessary to implement it; and they must have the will to do so.

To be quite honest it seems to me that there is fundamentally nothing special that the layman as lay brings to the academic enterprise which is the Catholic university, nor is there anything special that the religious as religious or the cleric as cleric brings to it.³ Lay and religious alike can have the vision, the talent, and the will; and any given layman and any given religious can lack any or all of these qualifications. In terms of what is essential, a community totally lay (or a community totally religious) could build and maintain an authentic Catholic university, though for many non-essential reasons a mixed community will in all probability actually do the job best. However, it is not the *mix* which counts, but the vision, the talent, and the will.

Some have argued that given a predominantly Catholic membership in the university community that university will somehow then be a Catholic university. There is something drastically wrong with this argument. It is the distinctive plan and plan-implementation of the Catholic university which makes it Catholic as a university. A Catholic presence, in the sense of a majority membership in the university community of committed Catholics, is no guarantee of the kind of vision and management necessary for the distinctive enterprise which is the Catholic university. At the same time it would be difficult to conceive of the possibility of the necessary vision in a community which was negligibly Catholic in membership. There is room for both Catholics and non-Catholics in the Catholic university community, something to be contributed and something to be gained by both. What is essential is that the controlling vision be an explicitly articulated and self-consciously appreciated plan which effectively embodies the authentic rationale of Catholic higher education.

Several Jesuit universities of late have moved to boards of trustees which are predominantly lay, and others will do so in the future. At the same time care has been taken to ensure some Jesuit presence on these boards and to guarantee a Jesuit president for the schools in question. Much has been made of the predominance of laymen on the boards, with special care taken to point to membership on the part of several non-Catholics. The

move to predominantly lay boards which include both Catholics and non-Catholics is, I think, a good move. It will serve many specific purposes. On the general level it is to be applauded because it broadens significantly the base of talent from which appropriate membership on these boards can be drawn. It is necessary to have men experienced in the world of business and the secular professions on our governing boards. It is necessary, too, that there be significant representation on the part of academicians who have an especially knowledgeable feel for the unique kind of institution the university is. It is important that enough of these—in both groups, but especially the latter—share in the vision of the authentically Catholic university so that in determining policy for our Jesuit colleges they do so in such fashion as to guarantee that distinctive character which is our crucial *raison d'être*. With what is *essential* to our Catholic universities in mind, what finally counts for our trustees as well as for the other members of the university community is not whether they are religious or lay, even Catholic or non-Catholic, but that they have the *appropriate* vision, talent, and will.

Just as there are good practical reasons for predominantly lay membership on our governing boards, so there are good practical reasons for limiting the presidency of our Jesuit universities to members of the Society of Jesus. Nonetheless, consistent with my general thesis, it seems to me that with the *essence* of the Catholic university in mind, there is no compelling reason not to consider the possibility of opening Jesuit presidencies to non-Jesuits. Once again the crucial question seems to be one of appropriate vision, talent, and will. A Jesuit president, though Jesuit, might lack appropriate vision and thus be unable to build and manage an authentically Catholic and Jesuit university, while a layman might have the appropriate vision and be able, even though he is not a Jesuit, to guarantee the Catholic integrity of the school over which he presides.

Clearly it is not necessary that all the administrators in a Catholic college have the vision of which I speak. But key academic administrators must have it. A solid understanding of what the distinctive nature of the Catholic university should be is an essential ingredient in the makeup of any man who is crucially involved in shaping the academic policy of the institution which presumes to present itself as a Catholic university.

Policy these days, of course, is shaped by administration-and-

faculty, and this is good. This means that faculty influence in formulating policy at the Catholic university must come from a faculty base itself committed to and knowledgeable of an appropriate vision of the Catholic university. Insuring this kind of faculty base is not an easy task. We might hope to educate our faculty in this regard, and surely an attempt in this direction must be continually on-going. However, it is more important for at least two reasons that we solve this problem by way of judicious appointments to our faculty. One reason is that it is extremely difficult to educate a non-committed faculty in something as fundamental as this. The other is that in this we should look to the faculty itself as a prime educative principle. From the faculty there should come a sharpening of the vision and the kind of planning and counsel which will allow us to take effective steps for a meaningful implementation of the sharper vision. We must take care in appointments to the faculty that we bring on men who can contribute in a significant way to the academic well-being of the Catholic university as such. Once again it should be pointed out that not all of our faculty need be Catholic and not all of our faculty, Catholic or non-Catholic, need have the vision I speak of. It is necessary that enough of our faculty, Catholic or non-Catholic, share the vision so that it can be an efficacious vision. It seems important in this regard that the chairmen of departments whose disciplines are significantly sensitive to the Christian thrust share the vision and have the will to work for its implementation. In all of this it is understood, of course, that we must seek faculty with solid academic credentials and talent. If, in this regard, we speak of a special kind of faculty person, let it be clear that he cannot be one less qualified than the faculty person who would be appointed to a top-flight non-Catholic university. We are not speaking of a special interest and orientation, one which is especially appropriate to the Catholic context. It seems unnecessary to press the fact that the difference here between lay and religious faculty is not crucial.⁴

It is expected that the authentically Catholic college will have a special appeal to the Catholic student, especially the Catholic student who is concerned to examine the full implications of his Catholicity and to prepare himself through his college education for what for him seems to be a full human experience. At the same time the Catholic university must be open to all students, of whatever faith or no faith. The Catholic university should be able to

offer a profitable educational experience for all students, and it may well be in some cases that its distinctive character as Catholic will in fact give it a special appeal even to some non-Catholics.⁵

My position throughout the first part of this paper has been consistently that there is no significant difference between the lay man and the Jesuit, precisely as lay and Jesuit respectively, as each faces the essential work of the Jesuit university. The question is radically one of appropriate vision, talent, and will; and there are no *a priori* reasons why either must have these or why either cannot have them. However, some further points should be suggested, and these may be interpreted as modifying somewhat my basic position.

Each one of us brings as a resource for whatever we do on the Jesuit campus the totality of what we are as persons. And what we are in our total personalities depends partially and significantly on our lived experiences. The religious life of the Jesuit within the Society brings with it an experience different from that of the layman in the secular city. The total university community is enriched, but somewhat differently, by each of these experiences.

Let me illustrate in reference to teaching. The program of liberal education which is the core of the total academic program of the Jesuit university ultimately intends the fully free authentically human life of those for whom it is designed. The faculty efforts in research and teaching are major ingredients in this program of liberal education. The students, who in large measure should be the beneficiaries of these efforts, deserve the kind of variegated input that comes from the combination of lay and religious experience. Inasmuch as the students, most of whom will live in the secular world, seek an education which is relevant to the world in which they will live and seek to perfect themselves as men, the secular experience of the lay professor seems especially important. The complex of lay faculty can bring a variety of experiences to bear on the total educational effort of the university which will particularize and concretize and lend existential force and relevance to the educational experience of the student. The least that I am saying is that because he is lay, the layman will teach from experiences different from those of the religious. Even if this did not make his teaching more significant for his students than if he were a religious, it does make it different, and this difference *adds* to the totality of the educational resources of the university. Each layman should strive to make the most of his unique experi-

ences and to put the fullness of himself into his teaching effort. In doing so he will make a specifically lay and a uniquely personal contribution to the essential life of the university community.

PART II

It is not an easy thing to divide the totality of university life into neatly distinguished differing segments. One runs the risk of breaking most of the rules of a good division. For one thing university life is existentially whole and as it is lived defies compartmentalization. And even if one were to satisfy himself that for purposes of analysis he had separated one determinate segment off from another, who would be rash enough to claim he had identified all the significant segments? General distinctions are easier to make than specific ones, and thus far I have distinguished generally between the essential and non-essential segments of university life. In this second part of my paper I will attempt to subdivide the non-essential into further segments. Before doing so let me admit that there are difficulties even on the level of my general distinction. I trust that this paragraph will be taken as my apology for them. As a matter of fact I won't attempt a complete division of the non-essential into its segments, but concentrate merely on two non-essential but significant aspects of life on the Catholic university campus: the liturgical and the social.

Someone else in another paper will address himself to the specifics of the liturgical life on the Jesuit campus. I look forward with great anticipation to this paper and our discussion on it. There is certainly a felt need on the part of lay students, faculty, and administrators for a more intense and meaningful campus liturgical life. This is, of course, especially true as far as students are concerned. Lay faculty and administrators ordinarily have the opportunity and obligation to participate in the liturgy with their families in their home parishes, though this does not rule out the possibility of participation at least in a limited fashion in the campus liturgy.

One of the great benefits for the Catholic student at the Catholic university is the possibility of participating in a meaningful liturgical life as a member of the university community. I say "possibility" because we seem to be a long way on most of our Jesuit campuses from a truly meaningful liturgical life that effectively engages the majority of even the Catholic members of the community. A Jewish member of our faculty who this year joined us

from a state school recently confided his great disappointment at finding less liturgical vitality on our campus than he had found on the state university campus. He may not have been accurate in his comparative assessment, but certainly if we did have an undeniably healthy and widespread liturgical life he would not have even suspected what he opined.

As we look to the liturgical life on the Catholic campus we should do so as members of one vital human community. In reference to this community, looking to the liturgy, the difference between layman and Jesuit is significant. Jesuit and lay comprise one community engaged in one liturgical life, but these two play significantly different roles in living this liturgical life.

To this life the layman brings himself as lay, and this seems to me to be a real contribution, for unless I am wrong, the priest lives the liturgical life fully only with the people (as they with him). It seems no small thing for the Jesuits in the university community to have the possibility for the fullness of the liturgy in league with the lay members of that community.

The layman on campus, student or faculty, bears a responsibility to himself and to his university community to seek out opportunities to plan and to engage in a meaningful liturgical campus experience. One of the qualifications for a fully contributing Catholic lay members in this Catholic university community is an efficacious interest in the campus liturgy.

Many of our students are relatively inexperienced in living a liturgical life when they enter our university community. They have a right to this experience on campus, both for the campus experience itself and because through it they can learn for the sake of a fuller Christian life for themselves and their families and their parishes after they leave us. The students are transient, but faculty and administrators represent a relatively stable sector of the university community. Because of this, and because even today the young are influenced by the example of their elders, the Catholic lay members of the faculty and administration should take the liturgical life of the campus seriously and, to the extent to which they are able, engage in it with the students. Here is an area in which lay witness is exceedingly important. One of the qualifications for contemporary impact seems certainly to be an ability and willingness to participate precisely as a lay member of the community in its liturgical life.

We cannot bring students to our campus and expect them to

prosper in the essential (i.e., academic) life of the campus without making it possible for them to have sufficient opportunity for adequate social expression. There must be provision somehow for recreational and cultural experiences. Obviously the university ought not to be a country club, nor should the social life of the student so dominate as to keep him from his academic efforts. And obviously university officials ought not to program the social life of the student in an all-enveloping paternalistic fashion. But with all these caveats, the fact remains that sufficient opportunity for adequate social expression is needed.

It seems to me that the members of the faculty and the administration can participate in the social life of the student in many ways, enriching it without dominating it. This is particularly true, it would seem, for the lay members of the faculty and administration.

Serving as moderators of student organizations, acting as chaperones, accepting invitations as speakers or simply as guests at student dinners and parties are examples of quite ordinary but extremely effective ways of enriching the social life of the student.

The students do not consider the student union as off limits to us. We should not act as though it were. One of the reasons for student unrest these days is that students do not feel that the so-called university community is really a community—and they do have a felt need for community. We can help to overcome this by mixing occasionally, quietly, sincerely, and certainly not in any overpowering fashion, with our students while they are at play, for lunch or dinner, in their informal discussions. The students are an essential part of the university community. They deserve to be treated as though they were. They deserve to be loved. One of the important qualifications for contemporary impact on the part of the lay members of the university faculty and administration is that they do love and express this love in authentic community activity.

Students are frequently lonely, as also sometimes faculty members are. Loneliness is a sign of lack of community, and loneliness can kill the spirit of the one who suffers it. Lay members of the faculty and administration should be alert to signs of loneliness in their students and in their colleagues and help to overcome this, thus creating community and salvaging spirits. One significant way in which the layman can help in this regard is by inviting students and colleagues into his home to enjoy the refreshment that

comes even with a transient participation in a true family life. Being able and willing to do this is another qualification for contemporary impact and another manifestation of significant lay witness.

All of the things I have mentioned that we can do to foster a happy and healthy social life for our students are things to be done by faculty and administrators on every campus, Catholic or not. Still there seems a special imperative that this be a way of life on the Catholic campus. The spirit of Christ is love. I have not been talking about providing social opportunities for our students simply for the cold and calculated reason that if we don't they will lack the relaxation they need to be able to see their academic responsibilities through to some successful end, though this is a reason. I have been talking about loving our students and expressing this love in acts of authentic friendship. On the Christian campus should the students expect any less?

Let me note in this regard that if the layman on the Catholic campus should be moved in a special way by love to foster the social well-being of his students and colleagues, so too he should be moved by love to foster the liturgical life of his university and community, and so too he should be moved by love to make an extraordinary effort to see that the essential, i.e., the academic, life of the campus is lived to the fullest. There was a time, say twenty years ago, when Catholic campuses were scenes of love but too little truly professional competence and professional practice. Since then we have become exceedingly professional, but perhaps there is less love than there once was. If so, then all of us, lay and Jesuit together, have our work cut out for us.

I have one final point to make and, as was the case with my comment on love, this point looks to both the essential and non-essential aspects of our life. In recent years our lay faculty, as also to a degree even our Jesuits, have become extremely mobile. Unfortunately with the enhanced possibility of moving from one institution to another there has been a decreasing intensity in what has been called institutional commitment. This is unfortunate precisely because a relatively stable and committed faculty is a necessary condition for university excellence in both the essential and non-essential aspects of university life. The university makes its impact through its members, but in a sense its members make their impact through the university. It seems to me that a prime qualification for contemporary impact in the Jesuit uni-

versity—for both the lay and Jesuit members of the university community—is a renewed sense of institutional commitment. Perhaps the most significant thing that can come from our JEA Workshop is a strengthened confidence in the crucial importance of the Catholic university and through this an efficacious renewal of the real sense of personal commitment to our Jesuit institutions of higher education.

REFERENCES

1 I refer to my colleague Dr. Quentin L. Quade, Dean of the Marquette University Graduate School. Though I mention Quade in this place in my paper to take issue with him, I do appreciate the opportunity to acknowledge my debt to him for many of the thoughts embodied in the first part of the paper. Quade has written well of the essential difference which should manifest itself in the academic program of the Catholic university in the April 5, 1969 issue of *America* ("The Catholic University: Christian Perspective").

2 I have spoken of the place of Christian theology in the Catholic university, but I have not spoken of the Church. Perhaps I should have, because it would seem that the faith commitment which gives vitality to the program of theology in the Catholic university is ecclesial as well as personal.

3 In saying this I have not forgotten that it was Jesuits who built and nurtured the Jesuit universities which give to so many of us laymen the opportunity to participate in the work of Catholic education.

4 If it is true that the difference between a lay faculty person and a Jesuit faculty person, as lay and Jesuit respectively, is not crucial from an essential point of view in even a Jesuit university one might wonder why any Jesuit should be interested in and committed to the university as an apostolic venture. In fact a good number of Jesuits do wonder, and for some of them the question is an agonizing one. An authentic Catholic university is authentically a university and authentically Catholic. It promotes the well being of the secular world and serves the interests of the Church and the People of God. For the good of both the secular world and the Church some good Catholic universities should be maintained. To me this argues for the apostolic value in the continuing effort on the part of the Society of Jesus to maintain Catholic universities.

5 Interestingly Christopher Jencks and David Riesman in *The Academic Revolution* (Doubleday, 1968) issue a challenge to Catholic universities to be different, not merely to try to prove that "Catholics can beat non-Catholics at the latter's game" but to do "something more," to manage "to fuse academic professionalism with concern for questions of ultimate social and moral importance." (p. 405)

Enrollment Statistics

Scholastic Year 1969-1970

Student enrollments in the Jesuit high schools, colleges and universities in the United States at the beginning of the current scholastic year, 1969-1970, totaled 193,459, an increase of 4,764 (2.5%) over the scholastic year 1968-1969. This total does not include those who are enrolled in Jesuit Novitiates and Houses of Studies; these students are included, in great part, in the enrollment statistics given by Jesuit colleges and universities.

Colleges and Universities

The total enrollment in our colleges and universities has increased by 3% from 150,884 in 1968-1969 to 155,469 in 1969-1970, an increase of 4,585 students.

Increases were recorded in both full-time (+2,576) and part-time (+2,405) total enrollments; in Liberal Arts colleges, day division (+2,411) and evening division (+472); in the evening division of Commerce (+1,344); in Engineering (+34); in Law (+358); in Medicine (+80); and in Graduate Schools (+2,438). Decreases in enrollment occurred in the day division of Commerce (-341); in Education (-500); in Nursing (-137); and in the Miscellaneous categories (-1,091). There was a 5.0% decrease in Summer School enrollments; in Undergraduate Departments there were 3,277 fewer students than in the summer of 1968, but in Graduate Departments there was an increase of 202.

Twenty-two colleges and universities reported increases in their grand total enrollment and eighteen in full-time enrollment. The largest increases in grand total enrollment were reported by Loyola, Chicago, (+1,231), Loyola, Los Angeles, (+606), University of San Francisco (+487), Fordham (+469), and the University of Detroit (+439). Saint Louis University reported a decrease of 870 students in grand total enrollment, but the loss was entirely in the part-time categories; full-time enrollment increased by 211. Only three institutions reported losses in both grand total and full-time enrollment: Marquette, Seattle, and Wheeling.

Although fourteen of our institutions seem to have dropped slightly in full-time freshman enrollment, no accurate comparison can be made in this category between this year and last. The figures for this year are accurate; last year's figures were the result

of an adjustment which may have been slightly erroneous.

In grand total enrollments the five largest universities are the following: 1) Loyola of Chicago (16,266); 2) Marquette (11,721); 3) Saint Louis (11,232); 4) Fordham (11,225); 5) Boston College (10,214).

Considering only full-time enrollments the same five institutions rank in a slightly different order: 1) Loyola of Chicago (8,594); 2) Boston College (8,205); 3) Marquette (7,796); 4) Fordham (7,703); 5) Saint Louis (7,633).

The five largest Jesuit Liberal Arts colleges, day division, are: 1) Loyola of Chicago (5,185); 2) Fordham (4,471); 3) Marquette (3,618); 4) Saint Louis (3,080); 5) John Carroll (2,833).

Under the category of Miscellaneous, the following are included: Aerodynamics, Architecture, Commercial Certificates, Dental Assistants, Dental Hygiene, Foreign Service, Journalism, Language and Linguistics, Medical Technology, Music, Physical Therapy, Speech, Teaching Certificates and Post Graduate Courses.

High Schools

Thirty Jesuit high schools reported increased enrollments; twenty-four reported decreases and the enrollment at Regis High School of New York remained unchanged. That the variations are slight ones is indicated by the fact that the total enrollment increase amounts to only 179 students, slightly less than one-half of one percent. The largest increases are reported by De Smet Jesuit High School of Saint Louis (+152) which is only in its third year of operation, and Bishop Connolly High of Fall River, Massachusetts (+102) which enrolled its first senior class this year.

The category of "Special" listed in the enrollment table refers almost exclusively to students who are in the upper elementary grades which are taught in a few of our high schools.

The eight largest Jesuit high schools in the United States each enroll more than one thousand students. They are: 1) Loyola Academy at Wilmette, Illinois (1,723); 2) Boston College High School (1,259); 3) Saint Xavier High School of Cincinnati (1,241); 4) Saint Ignatius High School of Cleveland (1,152); 5) Saint Ignatius College Preparatory in Chicago (1,110); 6) Saint Ignatius College Preparatory at San Francisco (1,090); 7) Bellarmine College Preparatory at San Jose (1,068); 8) Marquette University High School (1,029).

Houses of Studies

Because of the changing situation in the location and functions of our Jesuit Houses of Studies it is difficult to make comparisons between current enrollment figures and those of last year. Total enrollment for this year is 182 less than last year.

Summary

28 Colleges and Universities	155,469
55 High Schools	37,990
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83 Jesuit Institutions	193,459

Jesuit Educational Association

High School Enrollment 1969-1970

TABLE ONE

	Freshmen	Sophomores	Juniors	Seniors	Specials	Totals 1969-70	Totals 1968-69	Increase or Decrease
Bellarmine College Preparatory (San Jose).....	292	267	264	245	0	1,068	1,019	+ 49
Bellarmine Preparatory School (Tacoma).....	139	116	115	103	0	473	466	+ 7
Bishop Connolly High (Fall River).....	115	103	92	87	0	397	295	+102
Bishop's Latin School (Pittsburgh).....	35	26	33	19	0	113	116	- 3
Boston College High School.....	359	313	288	299	0	1,259	1,284	- 25
Brebeuf Preparatory School (Indianapolis).....	157	159	168	162	0	646	701	- 55
Brooklyn Preparatory School.....	176	238	210	218	0	842	980	-138
Brophy College Prep School (Phoenix).....	187	158	134	132	0	611	573	+ 38
Campion Jesuit High School.....	129	143	106	120	0	498	563	- 65
Canisius High School.....	253	192	192	219	0	856	850	+ 6
Chaplain Kapau Memorial High (Wichita)....	138	108	101	111	0	458	489	- 31
Cheverus High School (Portland, Me.).....	89	92	104	95	0	380	396	- 16
Colegio San Ignacio (Puerto Rico).....	120	118	126	115	236	715	733	- 18
Cranwell School (Lenox, Mass.).....	47	81	68	66	5	267	247	+ 20
Creighton Preparatory School.....	227	223	212	204	0	866	928	- 62
DeSmet Jesuit High School (Saint Louis).....	216	210	186	0	0	612	460	+152
Fairfield College Preparatory School.....	222	190	169	189	0	770	802	- 32
Fordham Preparatory School.....	227	154	159	214	0	754	794	- 40
Georgetown Preparatory School.....	95	92	91	78	0	356	328	+ 28
Gonzaga High School (D.C.).....	169	183	158	169	30	709	697	+ 12
Gonzaga Preparatory School (Spokane).....	211	164	158	179	0	712	744	- 32
Jesuit College Preparatory School (Dallas)....	139	134	135	117	0	525	520	+ 5
Jesuit High School (El Paso).....	112	91	83	68	0	354	384	- 30
Jesuit High School (New Orleans).....	203	206	193	161	126	889	913	- 24
Jesuit High School (Portland, Ore.).....	148	138	133	91	0	510	532	- 22
Jesuit High School (Sacramento).....	173	155	113	115	0	556	520	+ 36
Jesuit High School (Shreveport).....	106	75	57	59	0	297	264	+ 33
Jesuit High School (Tampa).....	134	134	135	106	0	509	504	+ 5
Loyola Academy (Wilmette, Ill.).....	488	445	408	382	0	1,723	1,644	+ 79
Loyola Blakefield (Baltimore).....	205	200	155	140	0	700	699	+ 1
Loyola High School (L.A.).....	267	239	236	205	0	947	940	+ 7
Loyola High School (Missoula).....	36	29	33	33	0	131	128	+ 3
Loyola School (N.Y.).....	42	40	52	35	0	169	177	- 8
Marquette University High School.....	277	271	248	233	0	1,029	952	+ 77
McQuaid Jesuit High School (Rochester).....	238	202	163	179	52	834	817	+ 17
Regis High School (Denver).....	183	154	138	118	0	593	571	+ 22
Regis High School (N. Y.).....	163	150	140	139	0	592	592	...
Rockhurst High School.....	198	192	194	189	0	773	795	- 22
St. Ignatius College Preparatory (Chicago)....	284	308	258	260	0	1,110	1,095	+ 15
St. Ignatius College Preparatory (San Francisco)	295	284	263	248	0	1,090	1,066	+ 24
St. Ignatius High School (Cleveland).....	316	323	261	252	0	1,152	1,170	- 18
St. John's High School (Toledo).....	203	196	178	167	0	744	805	- 61
St. Joseph's Preparatory School.....	299	258	192	199	0	948	872	+ 76
St. Louis University High School.....	222	213	217	213	0	865	879	- 14
St. Peter's Preparatory School (Jersey City)....	298	244	212	226	0	980	943	+ 37
St. Xavier High School (Cincinnati).....	345	306	290	300	0	1,241	1,229	+ 12
Scranton Preparatory School.....	120	135	122	114	0	491	487	+ 4
Seattle Preparatory School.....	157	141	116	138	0	552	548	+ 4
Strake Jesuit College Preparatory (Houston)....	123	102	84	84	3	396	373	+ 23
University of Detroit High School.....	207	261	193	239	0	900	978	- 78
Walsh Jesuit High School (Cuyahoga Falls, O.)	193	163	151	170	0	677	684	- 7
Xavier School (Concord).....	103	111	99	91	0	404	401	+ 3
Xavier High School (N. Y.).....	269	228	218	224	0	939	943	- 4
Colegio San Jose (Peru).....	82	81	71	61	57	352	324	+ 28
Colegio San Mateo (Chile).....	64	58	33	22	479	656	597	+ 59
Totals 1969-70.....	10,295	9,597	8,708	8,402	988	37,990		
Totals 1968-69.....	10,333	9,467	8,817	8,273	921		37,811	
Increase or Decrease.....	- 38	+130	-109	+129	+ 67	+179		+179

Jesuit Educational Association College and University Enrollment, 1969-1970

TABLE TWO

	Liberal Arts		Commerce		Education	Engineering	Nursing	Pharmacy	Dentistry	Law		Medicine	Graduate	Miscellaneous	Full Time Totals	Part Time Totals	Full and Part Time Totals	Extension Low Tuition Non-Credit	Grand Total	Summer School	
	Day	Evening	Day	Evening						Day	Evening									Undergrad	Graduate
Boston College.....	2,426	629	1,779	355	1,290	...	587	549	2,550	49	8,205	2,009	10,214	...	10,214	1,028	1,392
Canisius College.....	1,647	439	533	418	49	692	83	2,718	1,143	3,861	...	3,861	696	574
Creighton University.....	2,238	37	463	167	134	200	264	...	320	411	...	3,378	656	4,234	...	4,234	569	550
Fairfield University.....	1,852	1,296	...	1,915	1,233	3,148	...	3,148	320	1,240
Fordham University.....	4,471	1,696	846	...	320	106	...	446	314	...	3,027	...	7,703	3,523	11,226	...	11,226	2,022	2,366
Georgetown University.....	1,730	...	565	297	...	419	819	450	471	1,473	1,718	6,584	1,358	7,942	...	7,942	1,686	792
Gonzaga University.....	1,626	284	15	157	153	152	102	212	2,257	444	2,701	...	2,701	376	335
Holy Cross College.....	2,519	5	...	2,444	80	2,524	33	2,557
John Carroll University.....	2,833	...	342	302	874	18	2,793	1,576	4,369	398	4,767	1,734	773
Le Moyne College.....	1,715	1,715	...	1,715	227	1,942	440	...
Loyola College (Baltimore).....	978	1,205	835	...	1,030	1,988	3,018	...	3,018	700	586
Loyola University (Chicago).....	5,185	2,798	749	...	216	...	423	...	432	227	187	384	3,665	85	8,594	5,757	14,351	1,915	16,266	5,036	2,623
Loyola University (Los Angeles).....	1,151	...	344	182	484	395	...	552	...	2,374	734	3,108	513	3,621	719	411
Loyola University (New Orleans).....	1,384	...	465	1,318	117	522	818	299	2,817	2,106	4,923	...	4,923	526	73
Marquette University.....	3,618	654	836	552	...	1,277	386	...	461	308	1,381	1,163	7,796	2,840	10,636	1,085	11,721	2,053	1,079
Regis College.....	1,027	205	1,232	...	1,232	...	1,232	380	...
Rockhurst College.....	656	...	387	1,284	978	1,349	2,327	...	2,327	556	...
St. Joseph's College.....	1,872	494	...	1,702	696	264	1,811	2,785	4,054	6,839	49	6,888	3,200	73
St. Louis University.....	3,080	319	775	364	...	368	576	...	68	210	135	487	3,273	833	7,653	2,855	10,488	744	11,232	2,306	2,391
St. Peter's College.....	2,004	507	491	1,071	643	2,606	2,110	4,716	420	5,136	2,630	...
Seattle University.....	1,495	...	492	...	567	225	196	493	...	2,649	819	3,468	...	3,468	998	477
Spring Hill College.....	970	970	...	970	...	970	573	...
University of Detroit.....	2,618	813	965	1,257	...	961	353	162	140	...	1553	308	5,628	3,502	9,130	189	9,319	1,586	178
University of San Francisco.....	2,161	1,088	427	719	360	208	153	...	963	725	4,178	2,626	6,804	56	6,860	2,795	682
University of Santa Clara.....	2,239	...	673	314	199	90	...	2,168	...	3,883	1,800	5,683	223	5,906	335	1,261
University of Scranton.....	982	355	351	278	225	55	76	649	...	1,556	1,415	2,971	...	2,971	987	605
Wheeling College.....	804	781	23	804	161	965	137	...
Xavier University.....	1,398	512	688	399	3,057	...	2,546	3,508	6,054	...	6,054	1,240	2,748
Totals 1969-1970.....	56,679	12,035	12,171	10,019	3,378	3,539	3,221	240	2,050	4,398	2,016	1,662	30,101	7,947	99,948	49,508	149,456	6,013	155,469	36,579	21,862
Totals 1968-1969.....	54,268	11,563	12,512	8,675	3,878	3,505	3,358	305	2,072	4,203	1,853	1,382	27,663	9,038	97,372	47,103	144,475	6,409	150,884	39,856	21,660

Jesuit Educational Association

Composite College Statistics, 1968-1969, 1969-1970

TABLE THREE	Grand Total		Increase Decrease		Freshman Enrollment		Increase Decrease	
	1969-70	1968-69	Numerical	Percentage	1969-70	1968-69	Numerical	Percentage
Boston College.....	10,214	9,972	+ 242	+ 2.4	1,661	1,757	- 96	- 5.5
Canisius College.....	3,861	3,824	+ 37	+ 1.0	667	717	- 50	- 7.0
Creighton University.....	4,234	4,179	+ 55	+ 1.3	694	723	- 29	- 4.0
Fairfield University.....	3,148	2,887	+ 261	+ 9.0	615	429	+186	+43.4
Fordham University.....	11,226	10,757	+ 469	+ 4.4	1,332	1,480	-148	-10.0
Georgetown University.....	7,942	7,730	+ 212	+ 2.7	1,088	1,044	+ 44	+ 4.2
Gonzaga University.....	2,701	2,652	+ 49	+ 1.8	674	782	-108	-13.8
Holy Cross College.....	2,557	2,373	+ 184	+ 7.8	774	609	+165	+27.1
John Carroll University.....	4,767	4,495	+ 272	+ 6.1	718	890	-172	-19.3
Loyola College.....	1,942	1,705	+ 237	+13.9	433	418	+ 15	+ 3.6
Loyola College (Baltimore).....	3,018	2,961	+ 57	+ 1.9	233	272	- 39	-14.3
Loyola University (Chicago).....	16,266	15,035	+1,231	+ 8.2	2,109	2,056	+ 53	+ 2.6
Loyola University (Los Angeles)...	3,621	3,015	+ 606	+20.9	414	466	- 52	-11.2
Loyola University (New Orleans) ..	4,923	4,544	+ 379	+ 8.3	677	540	+137	+25.4
Marquette University.....	11,721	12,264	- 543	- 4.4	1,625	1,588	+ 37	+ 2.3
Regis College.....	1,232	1,189	+ 43	+ 3.6	357	383	- 26	- 6.8
Rockhurst College.....	2,327	2,314	+ 13	+ 0.6	315	227	+ 88	+38.8
St. Joseph's College.....	6,888	6,793	+ 95	+ 1.4	515	654	-139	-21.2
St. Louis University.....	11,232	11,358	- 870	- 7.7	1,506	1,321	+185	+14.0
St. Peter's College.....	5,136	4,840	+ 296	+ 6.1	628	737	-109	-14.8
St. Xavier University.....	3,468	3,672	- 204	- 5.6	755	658	+ 97	+14.7
Strickland Hill College.....	970	1,186	- 216	-18.2	205	248	- 43	-17.3
University of Detroit.....	9,319	8,880	+ 439	+ 4.9	1,148	1,175	- 27	- 2.3
University of San Francisco.....	6,860	6,373	+ 487	+ 7.6	6,966	818	+148	+18.1
University of Santa Clara.....	5,906	5,859	- 176	- 3.0	942	815	+127	+15.6
University of Scranton.....	2,971	2,963	+ 8	+ 0.3	438	421	+ 17	+ 4.0
Wheeling College.....	965	1,029	- 64	- 6.2	220	224	- 4	- 1.8
Xavier University.....	6,054	6,035	+ 19	+ 0.3	544	474	+ 70	+14.8
Totals.....	155,469	150,884	+4,585	+ 3.0	22,253	21,926	+327	+ 1.5

Jesuit Educational Association

Jesuit Houses of Studies Enrollment 1969-1970

TABLE FOUR

	1st Year	2nd Year	3rd Year	4th Year	Totals 1969-70	Totals 1968-69	Increase Decrease
THEOLOGATES							
Berkeley	29	24	16	20	89	90	- 1
North Aurora	23	22	19	19	83	97	- 14
St. Louis	28	20	26	18	92	111	- 19
Weston	25	20	16	22	83	81	+ 2
Woodstock	66	47	35	42	190	188	+ 2
Totals	171	133	112	121*	537	567	- 30

*Note: Of the 121 fourth-year theologians, 43 are studying on campuses other than the five here listed.

COLLEGE PROGRAM

					Other	Total
Bellarmine, North Aurora	18	..	18
Boston College	12	28	20	4	64
Jesuit College, St. Bonifacius ..	13	16	29
Fordham, Murray-Weigel	15	21	21	3	60
Fusz Memorial, St. Louis	1	18	36	30	41	126
Loyola U., Los Angeles	8	10	18
Loyola U., New Orleans	5	6	4	..	15
Mount St. Michael	8	6	19	28	..	61
Spring Hill College	2	4	3	10	..	19
U of Detroit	14	19	8	41
Totals	46	105	121	131	48	451
Total (1968-1969)						546
Decrease						- 95

NOVITIATES

	Scholastic Novices		Brother Novices		Total
	1st Year	2nd Year	1st Year	2nd Year	
California: Queen of Peace	12	17	1	0	30
Chicago: Sacred Heart	6	6	0	0	12
Detroit: Colombiere	8	3	4	2	17
Maryland: Wernersville	13	11	0	3	27
Missouri: Florissant	8	10	0	1	19
New England: Shadowbrook	23	26	0	1	50
New Orleans: Grand Coteau	10	9	0	1	20
New York: St. Andrew, Syracuse ..	18	14	1	1	34
Oregon: Sheridan	11	4	1	1	17
Wisconsin: St. Bonifacius	10	8	0	0	18
Totals	119	108	7	10	244
Total (1968-1969)					301
Decrease					- 57
Grand Totals (1968-1969)					1,414
Grand Totals (1969-1970)					1,232
Decrease					-182

A Standardized Accounting System for Jesuit High Schools

JOSEPH T. TOBIN, S.J.

An accounting system is essentially a tool for the accurate recording of revenue and expenditures of any business enterprise, but more important, a tool for providing meaningful data to management. The value of any system depends upon its ability to fulfill these primary functions. Unless the system can provide a simple and accurate method of recording day-to-day transactions, financial account-ability will not be achieved. If the accounting operation does not furnish useful data, sound management will be impossible. A good accounting system is essential for the progress and development of any business enterprise.

The value of an accounting system is increased immeasurably when it has been standardized and adopted by a number of enterprises engaged in the same type of operation. With each company accounting for its income and expenditures in the same way, the system now provides comparative financial data. Administrators will find that they have a valuable source of information to assist them in their job of management. For example, comparative cost analysis will reveal whether their costs are in line with others in the group. Through the process of communication with one another, the group itself will eventually arrive at certain proven norms applicable to their particular type of business. A standardized accounting opens up many opportunities for improved management.

Over the past ten years an increasing amount of attention has been focused on the need for reliable and comparable financial data in the area of Catholic elementary and secondary education. The fifty-fifth National Catholic Educational Association convention in April, 1958 adopted the following resolution:

RESOLVED, That this Association undertake the development of a uniform system of financial accounting and reporting and adopt standardized techniques of determining pupil costs.

The Committee on Uniform Statistical Reporting of the N.C.E.A. undertook the implementation of this resolution. It used as its principal guide the manual published by the United States Office of Education entitled, *Financial Accounting for Local and State School Systems*.¹ This comprehensive manual on financial ac-

counting for public school systems was adapted by the committee for use in Catholic elementary and secondary schools. Under the capable leadership of Brother Leo V. Ryan, C.S.V., a handbook comparable to the public school manual was published in 1963 entitled, *An Accounting Manual for Catholic Elementary and Secondary Schools*.²

Brother Ryan's manual has answered a real need in Catholic education. A number of dioceses throughout the country have adopted the system for their schools. Religious teaching orders, such as the Christian Brothers, have incorporated the system in all of their schools. The benefits of standardized accounting and reporting are being realized by those who are "on the system." School administrators now have the necessary financial information for intelligent decision making.

Brother Ryan's manual has recently been revised.³ The work of revision was carried out by Brother J. Alfred Moroni, F.S.C., Professor of Accounting, Christian Brothers College, Memphis, Tennessee. Brother Moroni contributed greatly to the development of the original manual. Over the past six years he has been active in promoting the use of the manual through workshops, lectures, and seminars. His wide background of experience well qualifies him as a leader in the area of high school finance.

Five years of experience have convinced me personally of the value of the system. I realize that I have a reliable accounting and management tool which assures good financial accountability, meaningful reporting, and reasonably accurate financial forecasting. With the rather uncertain future that Catholic education faces today, along with greater involvement of the laity in Catholic education, it is extremely important to have the financial facts and to be able to explain them intelligently.

Through a very wise decision on the part of the administration, we have made it a policy to report annually the financial status of the high school to the Jesuit Community, lay faculty, and to all our publics. These publics include parents of our students, lay board of advisors, alumni, and even the student body itself. Such presentations have created a sense of confidence in the school administration. They provide an occasion for demonstrating that the school has an underlying sense of direction, and that every effort towards good management is being made. Such presentations also serve the purpose of dispelling ill-founded rumors and correcting misconceptions about the financial position of the high school.

The schedule (Schedule A) presented below serves to illustrate how the system can provide significant and useful information to the administrators of a high school.

A simplified analysis reveals that the school is experiencing real changes in its financial picture. The memo information at the bottom of the schedule indicates a tuition increase of \$200 for the 1969-70 school year. Despite this 30 percent increase, total revenue is expected to increase only 3 percent or \$22,000.

Total operating expenses for 1969-70 are projected at \$746,000, an increase of \$49,000 or 7 percent over the previous year. However, per student costs show a significant increase of 18 percent.

What changes are taking place in the over-all operation of the high school? Fewer Jesuit personnel along with an expanded financial aid program to needy students financed by the Jesuit Community has effected a \$84,000 decrease in a customary source of revenue. On a per student basis this amounts to \$86 per student. While the \$49,000 increase in operating expenses is not momentous, the anticipated drop in enrollment of 91 students has caused per student cost to jump 18 percent.

SCHEDULE A:

Income and Expenses for the Year Ended June 30, 1969
Projected Income and Expenses for the Year Ending June 30, 1970

	<i>Income & Expenses</i> <i>Year Ended</i> <i>June 30, 1969</i>		<i>Projected</i> <i>Income & Expenses</i> <i>Year Ending</i> <i>June 30, 1970</i>	
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Per</i> <i>Student</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Per</i> <i>Student</i>
INCOME				
Student Tuition and Fees, Net	\$613,000	\$635	\$724,000	\$827
Contributed Services of Jesuits	94,000	97	10,000	11
Other Sources of Income	20,000	21	15,000	18
Total Income	<u>727,000</u>	<u>753</u>	<u>749,000</u>	<u>856</u>
EXPENSES				
Administration	59,000	61	56,000	64
Instruction	489,000	506	492,000	562
Transportation	4,000	4	4,000	5
Operation and Maintenance of Plant	91,000	94	121,000	138
Fixed Charges	33,000	34	48,000	54
Student Body Activities, Net	21,000	23	25,000	29
Total Expenses	<u>697,000</u>	<u>722</u>	<u>746,000</u>	<u>852</u>
Excess of income over expenses before development activities	30,000	31	3,000	4
Net Receipts—Development	<u>52,000</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>41,000</u>	<u>46</u>
Excess of income over expenses	82,000	85	44,000	50
Appropriation to Plant Fund	<u>73,000</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>47,000</u>	<u>54</u>
Surplus (Deficit) for Year	<u>\$9,000</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>(\$3,000)</u>	<u>(4)</u>
Memo: Tuition Rate	\$600		\$800	
Enrollment	966		875	

The analysis points out two basic problems to which the administration must address itself:

1. What must be done to keep up enrollment?
2. How can the decreased revenue from Jesuit contributed services be compensated?

The benefits of a standardized system are most completely realized in the comparative data it provides. The financial operations of one school can now be readily compared with the other schools in the Province. Certain general norms on costs can be established as guides to administration. Administrative decisions on the Province level can be supported from an analysis of the comparative data. Province planners will find a useful source of information to direct them in their work of planning.

The schedule (Schedule B) presented on the following page illustrates how a standardized accounting system would provide such useful information.

For example, comparative analysis of the three schools reveals:

1. The *per student* subsidy in each school. Put another way, the dependence of each school on sources of income other than tuition and fees to meet operating expenses.

	<i>Contributed Services</i>	<i>Development Activities</i>	<i>Total Per Student Subsidy</i>
School A	\$96	\$46	\$145
School B	\$80	\$50	\$130
School C	\$60	\$50	\$110

2. Norms for certain costs, e.g., the percentage of Instructional costs to total operating costs.

	<i>Instructional Costs</i>	<i>Total Operating Costs</i>	<i>Percent of Instructional Costs to Total Operating Costs</i>
School A	\$364,000	\$526,000	69 percent
School B	\$300,000	\$413,000	72 percent
School C	\$492,000	\$681,000	72 percent

Norms could also be extended to each category of expense which would serve as guides for administration in each of the schools.

A standardized accounting system for Jesuit high schools offers many benefits to all levels of administration. The system presented in the recently revised manual, *An Accounting Manual for Catholic Elementary and Secondary Schools* has been implemented in

many diocesan school systems throughout the country as well as in the schools of a number of religious orders. It is a system which I highly recommend for consideration in our own high schools.

SCHEDULE B:
Comparative Income and Expenses for the Year Ended June 30, 1969
Province X High Schools

	School A		School B		School C	
	Total (\$1,000)	Per Student	Total (\$1,000)	Per Student	Total (\$1,000)	Per Student
INCOME						
Student Tuition and Fees, Net	\$370	\$370	\$256	\$320	\$480	\$320
Contributed Services of Jesuits	96	96	64	80	90	60
Other Sources of Income	14	14	8	10	15	10
Total Income	<u>480</u>	<u>480</u>	<u>328</u>	<u>410</u>	<u>585</u>	<u>390</u>
EXPENSES						
Administration	47	47	40	50	50	33
Instruction	364	364	300	375	492	328
Transportation	3	3	3	4	4	3
Operation and Maintenance of Plant	68	68	32	40	70	46
Fixed Charges	22	22	18	22	40	27
Student Body Activities, Net	22	22	20	25	25	17
Total Expenses	<u>526</u>	<u>526</u>	<u>413</u>	<u>516</u>	<u>681</u>	<u>454</u>
Excess of expenses over income before development activities	46	46	85	106	96	64
Net Receipts—Development	63	63	40	50	75	50
Excess (deficiency) of income over expenses	<u>(17)</u>	<u>(17)</u>	<u>(45)</u>	<u>(56)</u>	<u>(21)</u>	<u>(14)</u>
Memo: Enrollment	1,000		800		1,500	
Tuition Rate	\$340		\$300		\$300	

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2 Brother Leo V. Ryan, C.S.V., Ph.D., *An Accounting Manual for Catholic Elementary and Secondary Schools*, National Catholic Educational Association Washington, D.C., 1963.

3 Brother Leo V. Ryan, C.S.V., Ph.D., *An Accounting Manual for Catholic Elementary and Secondary Schools: Revised Edition* by Brother J. Alfred Moroni, F.S.C., National Catholic Educational Association, Washington, D.C., 1969.

Contemporary Adolescent Society

DAVID STRONG, S.J.

"... our adolescents today are cut off, probably more than ever before, from the adult society. They are still oriented towards fulfilling their parent's desires, but they look very much to their peers for approval as well. Consequently, our society, has within its midst a set of small teen-age societies, which focus teen-age interests and attitudes on things far removed from adult responsibilities, and which may develop standards that lead away from those goals established by the larger society." (Coleman, J. S., *The adolescent society*, N.Y., Free Press, 1961, p. 9)

This thesis of Coleman's contends that there is a tendency in our society towards the development of two separate cultures; the mature, adult world of responsible behaviour; and the independent and unpredictable culture of adolescence. This latter is seen to originate in the rejection of adult standards and is characterized by non-conformity.

This theory has been solidly supported by Erikson,¹ Kingsley Davis,^{2, 3} Riesman,⁴ and Parsons.⁵ Therefore, it is necessary to examine the background of adolescent development to find if these conclusions can be verified.

No one denies that adolescents have physical and mental problems at this stage of their development. One such problem is achieving objective socialization. This involves learning new relationships with age-mates of both sexes, and with adults, as well as emotional independence from parents. They must learn to play a sound social role in order to win social approval and acceptance. The adolescent must satisfy his basic need to belong by feeling an integral part of society.

Yet, in achieving this state, other problems arise. First, he finds that he is relatively self-centered, and is confused with his sex drives, which need be controlled. He is no longer a child and not yet an adult. This causes feelings of estrangement with his parents and teachers, who don't seem to understand his thoughts and actions.

This lack of understanding between parents and children is the basis of the 'generation gap' theory. Adolescents complain that parents unreasonably restrain their desires for independence. For

their part they cherish "unrealistic expectation of achieving complete emancipation with the onset of pubescence",⁶ seen in the use of the car and dating practices. Parents frequently express difficulty in deciding the degree of independence that their children should experience.

Associated with this problem is that our society does not provide a distinct external status to adolescents. Mead^{7, 8} points to the initiation rites among primitive societies where there is a clear break with childhood and entrance into adulthood. In these primitive societies adolescents do not seem to have the difficulties of our adolescents, probably because they have the security of a definite social role.

Since adolescents have no clearly defined role, they must find one for themselves to serve as an outlet for their energies and to satisfy their needs. The most popular outlet is the peer group where he learns role-playing within the security of his contemporaries. With the security which this status society gives he is able to develop his own role-playing image, an ego identity independent of authority figures. It is through the peer group that the adolescent becomes of age, it is his initiation into adult society.

It would be a mistake to think that the adolescent peer group is isolated from the wider community. In fact, its nature, structures and norms are largely conditioned by the social milieu. Youth frequently and eloquently expresses disenchantment with aspects of the social order, and this tends to shock the older generation who fear that these youths will develop a culture with standards very different from traditionally established goals.

"Never have the young been so assertive or so articulate, so well educated or so worldly. Predictably, they are a highly independent breed, and—to adult eyes—their independence has made them highly unpredictable. This is not just a new generation, but a new kind of generation."⁹

This is a typical attitude taken by the pessimistic school. In seeking a reason for this condition, they believe that the social order has a great deal to do with the emergence of the 'New Breed'. With the advent of the atomic age, life has become faster and more complex, demanding new ways of solving newly found problems.

One problem seen is the decay of religion. Youth often mistrusts the Church as "the bastion of tradition"; they consider it

out of date, it does not satisfy their needs. Religion has little meaning for many adolescents, for it has little relevance in their lives. The gap between the generations can be clearly seen in the religious sphere, and indicates a breakdown in communication. The 'New Breed' need the Message to be translated into language that they understand.

A second problem is the decline in importance of the family. Coleman¹⁰ believes that the family has little to offer a child in the way of training for his place in the community; it is becoming less and less a homogenous unit. Once the family structure breaks down, its members, not finding security at home, will seek other means of satisfying their needs, means that often are not socially acceptable.

Attitudes towards sex is a third problem in modern society. where youth seem to be openly fostering a non-conformity to traditional moral customs. Many youths have little doubt that "illicit" sexual activities are a part of modern society. Promiscuity is fed to them daily through the mass media. Schofield,¹¹ supported by Kinsey,¹² indicate that by the time boys have reached their eighteenth year, 34% have had premarital sex relations. This may not be a higher percentage than in the past, but there is more notice and encouragement of such activities than before.

Further aspects of the new social order that are blamed for the cleavage between the generations are, too much money, mass media and mass education. Adolescents seem to be absorbed in pursuits that are completely different from the adult world: gangs, records, films, cars, etc.. They worry how they can be with the 'in group'. This is what Parsons¹³ considers to be the pattern of behaviour and attitude

"which do not constitute a stage in a continuous tradition from childhood to adulthood but deviate from such a line of continuity. This pattern of attitudes and behaviour is sufficiently general and pronounced to be singled out as a distinctively structured complex conveniently called the youth culture".

This school of thought sees the existence of an adolescent culture, youth who "live in a world of their own", in "yellow submarines", centering their world on coffee-bars, jukeboxes, miniskirts and hairstyles, and the two most important values in life are being 'with it' and 'with her'.¹⁴ With this as reality, they fear that established social goals may crumble.

Jessie Barnard¹⁵ considers adolescents to be "bearers of a conservative, traditional culture, which far from rejecting adult values, pays them the supreme compliment of imitating or borrowing them and adapting them to its own needs. Teenage culture is an adaptation or prototype or caricature of adult culture." This is an opinion which tries to see the good in youth groups: it sees adolescent society as a part of the wider society, a society where the wisdom of the ages is discussed and adapted to modern needs. What evidence is available for this position, because it seems to be the minority opinion in current literature?

Elkin and Westley¹⁶ made a study of middle-class suburban adolescents where they found evidence to support the "storm and stress" of the adolescent period: that adolescents wanted independence, were often irresponsible, keen on athleticism, romanticism, and frequently clashed with parents, but there was supporting evidence to indicate that these aspects of adolescence should not be exaggerated. They certainly exist, but, "there is more continuity than discontinuity in (their) socialization".¹⁷ It was also found that there was no universal validity to the idea that this adolescent culture was widespread. They found adolescents not compulsively independent nor rejecting adult values; in fact they were remarkably sophisticated. Finally, in testing the assumption that youth culture was linked to the "storm and stress" of the individual adolescent, they queried how this would account for adolescents seeking adult guidance, for deferring gratification patterns, for internalizing adult values and for sound family relationships. It has therefore been shown that while aspects of adolescent culture exist, it is by no means so widespread or so revolutionary as to suspect a new society in the making.

Another study, by Hess and Goldblatt¹⁸ was made by examining middle-class metropolitan high school children and their parents, testing their rating of each other. It was found that adolescents tend to idealize adults, but adults do not understand them. Parents, while expressing favourable opinions of adolescents, believe that they undervalue adults, and have a high opinion of themselves. Each group then mistrusts or misunderstands the opinions of the other. Hence, it is the problem of communication again.

Studies in Germany by Blucher¹⁹ indicate a further appreciation of adolescent behaviour:

"The young generation of the 60's is characterised not so much by an attitude of protest against existing society as by an 'im-

partiality towards everything new', 'freedom from any ideological preconceptions', flexibility, open-mindedness, calculated involvement, an enquiring approach to the world, freedom from prejudice, a love of experimentation, a 'joyful acceptance of life and all the possibilities that it offers'. It has the ability 'to stand up to the bewildering complexities of modern life, its self-assurance and composure'. Among the youth of today, the wish to be taken for adults is stronger than the tendency to isolate themselves in subcultures."

In this generous appraisal of adolescents we see an attitude of tolerance towards the younger generation, an attitude which appreciates their desires for earlier recognition by society of their value and worth. Many student activists today come from upper-middle class families,²⁰ where in fact there is little or no generational conflict, but these adolescents are dissatisfied with many ideals of modern society; they want to be valued by society, to give expression to their creative imaginations, to have their voices heard by the authorities, they need responsibility and an outlet for their initiative, they know they can contribute something of value to society, and are not prepared to wait as long as their forefathers for this contribution. These youths are intellectually mature long before they are recognised by society at large, but they exhibit emotional immaturity in their activities. These activists want integration into the larger society at an earlier age, so as to influence a change in the dominative, conservative adult society they experience; and if society was prepared to give them greater representation in decision making, the immaturity exhibited might disappear.

The study that is all important to the problem is that of Cervantes,²¹ who examined two groups: a drop out group, mainly lower-class; and a graduate group, middle-class, focusing attention on the family situation, the friend-family system, the peer group and school experience. On the whole it was found that the graduate group approximated to the type described by Elkin and Westley,²² whereas the drop-out group supported the pessimistic school very closely. The latter are described as

"Unroutinized, undisciplined and unsocialized. They seem unlettered, unambitious and uncommitted . . . Here is a world of muscular immature sons and initiated aggressive daughters . . . Here is an adult world of fragmented familial, unstable

marital, desultory occupational, truncated educational, and non-existent social service histories . . ."²³

After a series of interviews it was found that the reasons tending to produce this society-group were, the rate of social change, the peer group, resentment of parental authority, smaller families tending to heighten emotional problems, conflict of parental and commercialized youth cultures and parental delinquency.²⁴ Youth in this sub-culture who considered themselves rejected by their parents considered themselves as rejects in the total society. Their view of the wider community was coloured by their home-situation; their parents had given them little to live for, so society would probably treat them the same.

Two groups of adolescents have now been isolated. Which is the dominant group? Does this dominant group, to any dangerous degree, conflict with adult culture?

Looking closely at the adolescent culture of new clothes, cars, games, T.V., and dating, it will appear to differ very little in form from adult society. It certainly appears more extreme at times, from both groups, but this is understandable considering the age and status difference between the generations. Youth is keen to experiment, is free from prejudice, flexible and expressive, while the adult culture has already passed through this stage to a more sedate form of existence.

The peer group's power to heighten tension has been exaggerated. Parents generally encourage their children to belong to some group of friends, but they insist on the right to approve or disapprove of their choice, and some youth, particularly the drop-out, rebel over this interference with their liberty. In Cervantes' study four out of five drop-outs voiced inter-generational conflict, whereas four out of five graduates did not. This disagrees with Parson's generalization²⁵ that the youth culture is compulsively independent of and antagonistic to adult expectations and authority, and that there is compulsive conformity within the peer group. The graduate group in Cervantes study expressed continual interaction with parents and desired to be guided by them.²⁶ Ausubel²⁷ sees the peer group as a function of society "to secure a status and social identity for youngsters not generally provided with such an identity by society at large," and that the social goals of adolescents are basically orientated towards the adult world. Keniston²¹ agrees that most of today's college students are a dedicated group of professionals. Only about one in ten deviates from the code of

professionalism. "Few of these young men and women have any doubt that they will one day be part of our society . . . , They wonder about where they will fit in, but not about whether."

The pessimistic school believes, that because of conflicting interests of the two generations, independent cultures may emerge. This does not follow at all. Adults in society followed a similar pattern to our youth when they were young, and a new society, different from the old, did not result. It is true that modern youth has many more things to attract his attention than the previous generation, but this should not alter the goals of society to any marked degree.

"The young often seem romantic in search of a cause, rebels without 'raison d'être'. Yet in many ways they are markedly saner, more unselfish, less hag ridden than their elders."²⁹

Authority seems to be a major factor in the problem. Most adolescents claim to have difficulty at some stage. Cervantes tested adolescent reaction to parents forbidding contact with a certain peer group; if youth obeyed, adult culture survived; if youth disobeyed, peer group appeared independent of adult society. The graduates followed parents, the drop outs their friends. The average adolescent, then, it seems, tends to avoid overt conflict with parents.

Why then do many give the impression of rebelliousness against society? They are full of contradictions:

"While the adolescent is striking off on his own, his parents and his home continue to be of great importance in his life. He needs the anchorage which the home affords. It is important to him to be able to count on his parents as persons who regard him with disinterested affection and in whom he can confide without fear of ridicule or betrayal."³⁰

Youth may deny many sacred aspects of the adult world, yet know that he will largely have to conform in the end. Even though modern youth may be disenchanted with many social attitudes, they are trying to shake off the tyranny that regiments modern society and seek the freedom and scope they need for self-identification. Most want a different society, but not basically different. Perhaps they find it difficult to formulate, but change is desired, if not as regards goals, at least as regards many traditional ways of behaving. Society will change with the next

generation because it is an evolving phenomenon. Scientific discoveries are causing continual change in the attitudes and habits of society. But how much of the present youth culture will the new society contain? It is already evident that business interests, particularly through mass media, are catering to teenagers to a considerable degree. The teen-age image is being fostered in print, radio, television, record bars, etc.. This young generation will contribute something very real to society, just as every generation contributes something new to society.

Coleman, on the other hand, wants to reshape teen-age society or break it down, but by doing this he is breaking down the very basis of future society. What is it in teen-age society that Coleman finds at variance with adult culture? He quotes the activities of boys and girls, outdoor pursuits, hobbies, T.V., dancing etc., but it is very difficult to see how they basically differ from adult activities. In fact, it has already been suggested that perhaps they do not radically differ.

Therefore it can be seen that there exists a dual pattern of behaviour among adolescents with elements common to both, problems of authority, sex and self-identification. One group, better adjusted because of family upbringing, is able to integrate itself relatively smoothly into adult society. The other, the drop-out group, largely psychoanalytic cases, and not so well adjusted in themselves or with adult society, do form a distinct adolescent culture, which, while it lasts, is estranged from adult society. This group does seem to form a sub-culture with goals differing from the rest of society: but it is not usually a permanent condition. Many adolescents from this group finally become integrated into society; while it is only the minority of this group, the delinquents and criminals, that permanently remain outside society. This culture group, it must be remembered, is associated with the lower-classes in the metropolitan areas, and therefore not typical of adolescents as a whole. The fallacy in Coleman's argument is that he has generalized from this type to the whole of the youth culture. In discussing adolescent culture he has failed to distinguish between the two groups, that confused them and even exaggerated the role of this sub-culture in society.

Can this minority group be assisted in its integration with society at large? There is need to foster the idea of "realistic citizenship, training the young person to cope with the problems and pressures which tempt him to alienate himself from the society in

which he lives.”³¹ This social education will enable youth to take up a critical attitude towards society, to be aware of the pressures without being engulfed by them. Youth must be trained to reach this degree of critical discernment. They should be able to make a mature decision concerning their role in society.

The difference, then, between the studies of Cervantes and Coleman, from which the various conclusions are reached, is that, while both used a mixed sample of students from various socio-economic groups, the former discovered two different adolescent groups, the latter only one group, which he feared, could lead “away from goals established by the larger society”. The questions as to which is the dominant or larger group, and so more typical of adolescent behaviour can be answered by claiming that the middle-class educated adolescent is, in fact, more numerous than the drop-out. This is valid, at least, for such countries as U.S.A., Great Britain and Australia, where only the minority are social drop-outs.

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Why Call Us?

What Jesuit Writers Service Is All About

BARBARA A. MALLEY

The Yearbook of the Society for 1968-69 describes the working out of Father William Quiery's plan to set up a Jesuit Writers Service. The purpose was to take care of the many tasks writers haven't time for, details which use up time that could be spent on writing: re-typing, proof-reading, querying publishers, reviewing copyright and contract conditions. The article tells of Father's efforts to keep authors informed each step of the way so that he would not fall into the all-too-frequent practice of editors: leaving unread manuscripts on their desks for weeks or even months while authors wait helplessly for news. The Yearbook article stressed the innumerable go-between activities which have occupied about 90% of our time during the two years that JWS has been in operation.

Underlying all the practicalia, but perhaps not fully explained in the article, was the conviction that there are numerous men in the Society who have the sensitivity and creativity commonly attributed to other kinds of artists, men who have the compulsion to write. One of the major ideas behind JWS was to reach these men in the beginning of their training and help open the way for a lifetime of using their literary ability. The *primary* purpose of a service like this, then, is not to do the chores of the writer so that he can be free to do other things, but to do whatever will encourage him to make himself into a professional writer.

It has long been the cry of business men, doctors, and other professionals that their leading experts were unable to communicate clearly their expertise because they had not been trained in the intricacies of English prose. The fact that a writer must have something to say is easily accepted. But the fact that he must know HOW to say it is not so generally understood. We all know excellent mathematicians who are poor math teachers or magnificent pastoral counselors who are very poor preachers. Both have something to say but they lack the skill or the training or both to be effective in the classroom or the pulpit. The point is that if a Jesuit decides to write—because he has special knowledge or experience worth communicating—he must be willing, at least until he has communicated that something in writing, to take on

the characteristics of the WRITER. And, more important, if he wants to spend a lifetime making frequent or at least periodic contributions to the "literary" world, he has to do a lot more.

Here I feel compelled to contradict just a bit one of the originally stated purposes of JWS: to serve as a sort of buffer between the writer and an editor's rejection slips. Participants at the recent Georgetown Writer's Conference were treated to some of the best insights into what it takes to be a writer by Harry Edward Neal, retired secret service man who has written twenty-seven books on wide-ranging topics. After one of his early books was published, he was invited to address a local book club. The climax of his talk was a visual aid. He stretched from wall-to-wall of a large auditorium a ribbon on which he had hung, clothesline fashion, SOME of the many rejection slips he had received. "These", he proudly announced, "are like merit badges to a boy scout."

With that story as a jumping-off point, let me present in summary fashion some of the practical insights shared by the 25 or 30 authors and editors who addressed us. All of them had worked for years, with small successes and many failures, before hitting the big magazines or book publishers. All of them stressed very ordinary, work-a-day characteristics which seem to be the stuff that writers are made of—whether they be ladies' advice columnists, mystery writers, feature writers, historians or biographers, humorists, novelists or short story writers.

Read, read, read—not old things, not even good ones. Read your competition, the best modern writers in the field you're aiming at.

Saturate yourself in your subject and in the type of writing you're going to do. Don't begin writing until the first sentence writes itself.

The best way to avoid writing is to take writing courses. Take ONE if you must. Then write, write, write.

If you start something, finish it. If it's worth revising, go to it. If it's not worth revising, throw it away and write something else.

The difference between an amateur and a professional is that the professional can do it again—and probably better the second time.

Aphorisms? Maybe. But they're the name of the game. There wasn't a thing said at the conference about the work of the writer

that doesn't apply to anyone working at any profession. There wasn't a thing said about good scholarship and good writing that wasn't taught in Freshman English—or even in sixth grade composition. As I sat through the sessions it occurred to me that many of the participants were staking their success on someone else's work and that the misconceptions current among them might just be misconceptions shared by Jesuit writers. My point in mentioning this here is that there is nothing new to be said about writing, but somehow writers keep hoping there's a shortcut. They keep thinking that someone can provide a key which will eliminate the slow, hard climb.

Most of the writers present at Georgetown had published in small magazines or local newspapers, some in Sunday supplements or small syndicates. Many seemed to believe firmly that all they needed was an "in" to get to the big markets. If only they had an important friend or, in lieu of that, an agent. Since JWS operates in about the same way as any of the big literary agencies, it occurred to me that some aspiring Jesuit writers might also think that "once we send our manuscripts to JWS, success is sure."

Professionals addressing the conference repeatedly stated the hard facts:

No agent can sell what is not worth selling, no matter what his connections, no matter how great his interest in the writer.

There was a time when agents were friends and supports, editors and re-write counselors for their clients.

Now, big agents aren't interested in anyone who doesn't already write well or who writes only occasionally. They're interested in proven (and that means published) writers who will bring in fairly quick sales, assuring the agents of their 10% commission.

Many writers I met had searched in vain for the old-style agent with the time and interest to cultivate an author. Several of these people were in too much of a hurry to "make it big" but some understood that there's a difference between writing for minor markets and writing minor stuff. All they needed was guidance to help them improve enough to break out of the strictly local scene. Because JWS is not a profit-making organization deluged with hundreds of manuscripts each month, writers came to me each day asking if we could handle their work.

I realized, or re-discovered, that JWS has unique opportunities:

the opportunity to assure beginning writers that, if they're good they *will* be published—and to search for the appropriate publishers; the opportunity to advise young writers that, if they're determined to write, they can and should take a certain kind of satisfaction in collecting rejection slips or, more hopefully, publication in small magazines or book contracts with limited financial benefits; the opportunity to motivate men to re-work good ideas two or more times if necessary.

Elsa Russell, a *Reader's Digest* editor, who has regularly contributed to the Georgetown Conference, told of one article she returned for four re-writes. When the piece was finally in publishable form, it was decided that it was too Catholic for *Reader's Digest*, and the writer had to submit it to several other magazines before it saw printer's ink. Only a person determined to be a writer would be willing to go through all the grueling steps.

Turning aside from the craft of writing, let me spend some time on the tricks of the trade which we've learned from our work here. A Jesuit may wisely choose to use the service because he hasn't the time for or does not want to be bothered with the details of marketing. However, it is a good idea for him to be at least acquainted with some of the facts of the business.

Most free-lancers sell their own articles but turn to agents for book-selling. I will refer to the article business below. Here, I'd like to point out some of the advantages of using an agent for books. Most editors queried at the conference stated flatly that they simply return unsolicited manuscripts, unless they come from an established writer or from a recognized agent. They admitted that an agent sometimes sends poor material and that an unread manuscript sometimes turns into another editor's best-seller. But, the pressures of time are so great that some arbitrary system has to be set up. For this reason, even an agent will not usually send a manuscript without a previous query letter describing the content and general approach of the book as well as the qualifications of the author. If a manuscript goes only to editors who have already expressed interest, a great deal of time is saved.

It is not currently accepted as ethical to submit a manuscript to more than one publisher at the same time. Occasionally, when the book is very topical and the author is in a position to bargain, the agent may try two or three publishers at once. But he never does so without informing the several editors of this. An alternative that we sometimes use is to give the editor time limit: "If

we don't hear from you in x days, we will submit this to someone else." Obviously, we don't do this often since we are dealing with new writers who cannot yet make many demands. Publishers usually have two or three readers give a positive evaluation before they promise a contract, so we have to allow reasonable time. However, we do send a chaser letter after about three weeks asking for a tentative evaluation. If the letter isn't answered in about ten days, we ask for an immediate evaluation or the return of the manuscript. If at the beginning of the process we have queried several publishers and found more than one interested, we are ready for an immediate re-mailing.

Another advantage in having an agent is that he keeps up on the latest movements for authors' rights and is prepared to judge book contracts and advise omission of unfair clauses. The author, however, should have at least general knowledge of another legal question: copyright laws. If he uses material from published sources, he needs no permission for less than 500 words. For more, he—not his publisher—is responsible for obtaining permission from the original copyright holder and paying the required fee. Since the material in question may be edited out of the text somewhere along the line, it is not usual to pay the fee until publication time.

In marketing articles, we run into a situation which also applies to books but is much more of a problem with magazine articles: the writer must be writing *to* someone. We frequently encounter a manuscript which seems to indicate that the writer has not specified for himself what audience he is trying to reach. The usual technique for a free-lance writer, operating without an agent, is to get an article idea and do about one third of the work. Even before beginning the project, he aims at a particular publication, studying the usual length and style of its articles and judging the type of people who regularly read the publication. Then, before completing the article, he writes to the magazine to see if his idea interests the editors. If the first refuses, he follows the same procedure with others and completes his work only after he has some encouragement.

One night at Georgetown we had a public reading of short stories written by participants. One was condemned by almost everyone as trivial housewife-ly material. Whit Burnett, the founder of *STORY*, one of the best literary periodicals, decried the myopia of many women writers and berated them for not

expanding their worlds. He found the story in question entirely unpublishable. When, at the end of the session, the writers were invited to expose themselves, we learned that the author of the housewife's tale was a personable, talented, masculine writer who had frequently published in *The New Yorker* and comparable places. But he knew the market reached by *Good Housekeeping* and had dashed off a two-page story which he sold to them for \$1000 at a time when his sole object was to butter his bread.

Since we at JWS usually deal with a finished article, we miss out on the free-lancer's preliminary query stage. Therefore, it is even more important that we know a writer's *specific* target. As a service to beginning writers, we will soon be writing to a number of magazine and book publishers to try to determine what they will be looking for in the next year. We'll pass this information on to our writers in the hope that some of them can meet some of the editors' needs. Once a man is established, he can write what *he* likes and expect to sell it. But, while building a reputation, he should first write what the editors want. When he reaches the stage where people have seen his work and come after him for more, then he can begin bargaining for his own topics, space, price.

How does a person decide what market he's aiming at? One of the best sources is *Writers' Market*, published annually by *Writer's Digest* in Cincinnati and available in most large libraries. Publications are listed according to categories: general, religious, family, juvenile, various businesses and professions, etc. Starting in some special magazines makes sense; aiming immediately at the top is like starting a small boy in the major leagues. It isn't fair to put him against such competition. On the other hand, if he does succeed the first time, he's liable to mistake luck for talent and suffer later from the depression of a supposed slump.

After choosing a few possible markets, a free-lancer can usually obtain free back copies if he explains his purpose. If he is not writing specifically for a scholarly audience, he should not overlook such markets as IBM's *Think*, Eastman Kodak's house organ, *The Wall Street Journal*, the Scholastic line and those aimed at young adults. Many of these print all kinds of special interest articles in an effort to satisfy the varied tastes of their readers.

What I've described in the last seven or eight paragraphs is what we'd like writers to know before they submit material to us. If, however, they come at us cold, after one try they'll be pre-

pared to absorb these facts and to do more of the groundwork the second time 'round.

Epilogue For Writers Only

If perchance you are just at the point of sending us a manuscript —Don't! First write us a letter describing your literary background and professional background, your previously published works (if any), an outline of the work (very brief summary for an article), and the specific market you're aiming at. We may be able to save you a great deal of time by advising revisions right away. If it's a book idea you have, write to us as soon as you have completed three chapters and an outline of the remainder. Often we can get a contract at that point. If that doesn't look possible, we'll offer suggestions for the next phase of your work.

In two years, we've sold 27 books. We'd like to double that in the next two. More important, we'd like to see more published by the same men and more men deciding to start writing.

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